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In Conley v. Gibson, the Supreme Court announced its commitment to a liberal 
pleading regime in federal civil cases, and for decades thereafter was steadfast in 
resisting ad hoc heightened pleading rules adopted by lower courts. Thus, from 
1957 until a few years ago, most litigants could count on surviving a motion to 
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim so long as their pleading provided 
some minimal notice to the defendant of the nature of their claim. Enter Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Iqbal and Twombly, by many accounts, 
two-stepped the Court from notice to heightened “plausibility” pleading for all 
civil cases. And this shift garnered both applause and withering criticism. No one 
seems willing to defend the process that the Court used to abandon fifty years of 
pleading law—shorn as it was of any attention to the procedures contemplated by 
the Rules Enabling Act—but as a substantive matter, heightened pleading has 
many adherents. For its advocates, heightened pleading promises to reduce 
crowded dockets, make discovery available only to worthy litigants, and generally 
improve the quality of litigation to which attorneys and federal courts devote their 
attention. And at the bottom of it all lies a fundamental assumption: notice 
pleading lets in too many meritless cases, and heightened pleading will keep them 
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out. Despite this assumption, however, there has been almost no empirical analysis 
of the connection between merit and pleading. 
This Article critically intervenes in this discussion by providing empirical data 
to question the widespread assumptions about the costs and benefits of heightened 
pleading. The data reported here show that pleadings that survive a notice 
pleading standard but not a heightened pleading standard—what I refer to as 
“thin” pleadings—are just as likely to be successful as those cases that would 
survive heightened pleading. Indeed, the research summarized in this Article, 
gathered through a novel retrospective analysis of appellate and trial court 
decisions from 1990 to 1999, suggests that there is no correlation between the heft 
of a pleading and the ultimate success of a case. 
This Article certainly does not end the debate, but it is better to begin on solid 
empirical footing than on supposition alone. Although there are limitations to the 
data reported here, they can make an important contribution to the discussion, and 
they serve to call attention to the costs of heightened pleading even as they suggest 
avenues for further research. As Congress, the judiciary, and the academy are 
engaged in a critical discussion as to how to respond to the Supreme Court’s most 
recent alteration of pleading jurisprudence, relevant empirical data should be part 
of the conversation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Not for the first time, pleading is at a critical crossroads, being the subject of 
vigorous debate in the judiciary, the legislature, and the academy. The Supreme 
Court’s decisions in two recent cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly1 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 are the most obvious prompts for the renewed discussion. In 
Twombly, the Supreme Court adopted a “plausibility” pleading standard in 
reviewing the sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, overruling in part Conley v. 
Gibson,3 the 1957 case that ratified the “notice” pleading regime adopted by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Iqbal extended Twombly to all civil actions 
and applied an even more rigorous standard to a civil rights action filed against 
high-level federal officials.5 The end result is a pleading standard that heightens 
attention to “conclusory” pleading,6 treats state of mind allegations in a manner 
at odds with prior precedent,7 and encourages lower courts to apply their own 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 4. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–63 (reviewing criticisms of Conley and concluding that 
expansive language of the case “has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long 
enough”). 
 5. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (explaining that in determining whether a complaint is 
“plausible,” judges may rely on their “judicial experience and common sense”). 
 6. Id. at 1949–50 (stating that “conclusory” allegations are those that simply mirror the 
requirements of a cause of action). 
 7. Id. at 1954 (interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to require more than 
“general” allegations for state of mind even where neither fraud nor mistake is alleged). The 
Iqbal Court’s interpretation of Rule 9(b) is arguably at odds with the Advisory Committee 
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intuitions8 to decide whether a plaintiff’s9 legal claims and allegations are 
sufficient to proceed to discovery.10 
The shift from Conley to Iqbal/Twombly pleading has created controversy and 
confusion throughout the legal world, both as to whether the recent decisions are 
meaningfully different from past practice and as to whether anything should be 
done in response. The debate about just how much of pleading law was changed by 
Iqbal and Twombly is perhaps most active within the judiciary.11 And for those 
                                                                                                                 
Note to Rule 9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9 advisory committee’s note (citing ENGLISH RULES 
UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r. 22). The English rules 
cited by Rule 9 state that when a plaintiff makes allegations as to any “condition of the mind 
of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the 
circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.” Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal 
Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 
F.R.D. 143, 146 n.19 (1985). Moreover, as some courts have recognized, the Iqbal Court’s 
treatment of Rule 9(b) is in some tension with its prior decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema 
N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). See, e.g., Fowler v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr. Shadyside, 578 
F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009); Brown v. Castleton State Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 392, 403 
n.8 (D. Vt. 2009); see also Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at 
*7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (stating that tension between Swierkiewicz and Iqbal has yet 
to be resolved). 
 8. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (advising courts to rely on their “judicial experience 
and common sense” to determine the plausibility of a claim). 
 9. Pleading standards obviously apply to all parties. Defendants sometimes bring 
counter-, cross-, or third-party claims, and as such may face the burden of overcoming 
heightened pleading standards. Indeed, many courts have applied the Iqbal standard to strike 
affirmative defenses included by defendants in their answers. See, e.g., Francisco v. Verizon 
S., Inc., No. 3:09CV737, 2010 WL 2990159, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (collecting 
cases). But in this paper I will use “plaintiff” to refer generally to anyone who brings a claim 
that is subject to a particular pleading standard.  
 10. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 11. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (panel decision 
by Posner, J.) (describing Iqbal as “special in its own way” and suggesting that it should be 
limited to cases in which there are concerns about the burdens of discovery), with Fowler, 
578 F.3d at 210–11 (emphasizing breadth of Iqbal and suggesting that it overruled sub 
silentio Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 506). To be fair, the Supreme Court itself stated that it did 
not consider Twombly or Iqbal to break significant new ground, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 
1949–50; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007), and some lower courts 
seem to be taking the Court at its word. See, e.g., Valenti v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. 
Dist., No. 09-CV-977, 2010 WL 475203, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010); Rouse v. Berry, 680 
F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2010); Desrouleaux v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 09-61672-
CIV, 2009 WL 5214964 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2009); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 
08 Civ. 8909, 2009 WL 3003244, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009). The dissenters in Iqbal 
took a sharply different view, see Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959–61 (Souter, J., dissenting), and 
many lower courts have explicitly acknowledged the significant difference between 
adjudicating pleading motions before and after these decisions. See Young v. City of Visalia, 
687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144–46, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (interpreting Iqbal to overturn Ninth 
Circuit pleading precedent for constitutional claims against municipalities); Doe v. Butte 
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV. 09-245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 
2009) (questioning whether, after Iqbal, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure form 
complaints are still sufficient); Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 639 F. Supp. 2d 217, 
226 n.4 (D.P.R. 2009) (acknowledging Iqbal’s harsh results); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland 
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within the judicial branch who interpret the decisions as marking a significant 
change in pleading standards, there is the question of just what to do about it.12 
Meanwhile, some members of both the House and Senate have determined that 
Iqbal and Twombly were momentous and must be overruled legislatively.13 Finally, 
there is close to a consensus14 among academic observers that the Iqbal/Twombly 
pleading standard marks a sharp break with the past, a welcome change to some15 
                                                                                                                 
Sec., No. C 06-00545, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009) (criticizing the 
demanding nature of Iqbal standard); Williams v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:09 CV 1310, 
2009 WL 2151778, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 16, 2009) (describing Iqbal as imposing a 
heightened pleading standard); Kyle v. Holinka, No. 09-CV-90, 2009 WL 1867671, at *1 
(W.D. Wis. June 29, 2009) (describing Iqbal as “implicitly overturn[ing] decades of circuit 
precedent in which the court of appeals had allowed discrimination claims to be pleaded in a 
conclusory fashion”). 
 12. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules made Iqbal a central 
point of discussion for its May 2010 Civil Litigation Conference at Duke Law School. Press 
Release, Federal Judiciary, May Conference to Be First of Its Kind to Look at Civil 
Litigation in Federal Courts (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
News/NewsView/10-04-12/May_Conference_to_Be_First_of_Its_Kind_to_Look_at_Civil_ 
Litigation_in_Federal_Courts.aspx. And the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, while it 
considers the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s recent shift in pleadings jurisprudence, 
has been keeping diligent track of the lower court cases citing Iqbal and Twombly, as well as 
the dismissal rates pre- and post-Iqbal and Twombly. See Memorandum from Andrea 
Kuperman to Civil Rules Committee (July 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_072610.pdf; 
Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Motions to Dismiss, FED. RULEMAKING, 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Motions_to_ 
Dismiss_081210.pdf (last modified Sept. 17, 2010). 
 13. See Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Notice 
Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). These bills seek to 
ensure that pre-Twombly pleading rules govern Rule 8 standards. 
 14. At least one respected commentator has suggested that Iqbal and Twombly are not 
necessarily as consequential as most academics seem to believe. Edward A. Hartnett, 
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010) (arguing for limited 
reading of Twombly and Iqbal). 
 15. Those who support the rule applied in Iqbal and Twombly offer a variety of 
justifications. See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews 
v. Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing that the plausibility 
standard is a natural extension of procedural due process jurisprudence); Scott Dodson, 
Comparative Convergences in Pleading Standards, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 441 (2010) (arguing 
that Iqbal and Twombly conform to the pleading standards in practice outside the United 
States); Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy 
Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 641–43 (2008) (defending Twombly on notice 
grounds, the high costs of discovery, and concern over permitting “false positives” to 
proceed past the pleading stage); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The 
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 50–
53 (2008) (constructing an economic model to suggest that pleading standards are useful 
mediators of merit and defending Twombly under this framework); Sheldon Nahmod, 
Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 279, 303–05 (2010) (suggesting that Iqbal is a useful bar to certain 
constitutional claims); Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard: 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
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and lamentable to others.16 Particular attention has been paid to the impact of the 
Iqbal and Twombly rules on civil rights litigation, where informational asymmetry 
is often at its highest point but where federal courts and federal law have played an 
important historical role in developing and adjudicating substantive rights.17 
There are many purposes of litigation: compensating victims of wrongful 
conduct, deterring misconduct, enforcing important social norms, and eliminating 
the need for recourse to violent self-help, to name a few. In the United States, we 
generally rely on private parties to fulfill these goals with the assistance of a 
judicial infrastructure.18 Pleading rules play a special filtering, or “gatekeeping,” 
                                                                                                                 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463844 (maintaining that Iqbal will help to screen meritless cases 
that would otherwise settle because of discovery costs); see also Richard A. Epstein, Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 98–99 (2007) (defending Twombly to the extent that it is limited 
to a small subset of cases where there is heightened concern for weak or frivolous cases). 
But see Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 535, 558 (suggesting that a court concerned with the particular defense of qualified 
immunity has the power to impose fact pleading as a matter of substantive federal law, but 
arguing against it). 
 16. Critics of Iqbal and Twombly, like supporters, approach the cases from many 
different perspectives. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A 
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010) (maintaining that Iqbal 
has extended the plausibility analysis of Twombly in a dangerous direction); Edward D. 
Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 877, 879 (2008) (criticizing the change in pleading as a matter of process and 
questioning the Court’s assumption that lower courts and parties cannot manage discovery 
costs); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010) (suggesting that both cases be reconsidered because of their 
destabilizing effect and their inconsistency with the process of amending the Federal Rules); 
Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1932–34 
(2009) (stating that in Twombly, the Court acted “with no empirical support that a problem 
existed, and with no exploration of the dimensions of that problem or the efficacy of the 
Court’s newfangled cure”); Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading 
Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 NEB. L. REV. 261, 262 (2009) (suggesting that 
Iqbal’s pleading rule violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); Elizabeth M. 
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on 
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) 
(detailing the burden that the new pleading standard will impose on civil rights and 
employment discrimination plaintiffs); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. 
L. REV. 431, 460–86 (2008) (criticizing Twombly on numerous grounds, including for 
imposing a standard that would screen out meritorious as well as meritless claims); Suja A. 
Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and 
Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010) (arguing that the cases move the summary 
judgment inquiry to the pleading stage).  
 17. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 65, 85–101 (2010) (detailing the potential impact of Iqbal on civil rights 
cases); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 166–69 (2010) (describing tension between liberal pleading 
rules and the burdens imposed by substantive civil rights law). 
 18. In 2007, state courts received about eighteen million civil filings, an increase of 
about 800,000 cases from 2006. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
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role in this context.19 From this gatekeeping perspective, one can imagine many 
justifications for heightening pleading standards—the high costs of discovery20 and 
the desire to reduce heavy caseloads,21 among others—but a fundamental 
assumption made by those who support stricter pleading standards is that merit 
correlates with the factual detail offered by a claimant.22 On this account, the ease 
                                                                                                                 
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1 (2009). Financial 
disputes over money (primarily contract and small claims cases) comprised about 70% of the 
civil caseload in state courts. Id. In seven representative states, about 6% of civil filings were 
tort actions and 16% were probate filings. Id. at 2. It is fair to conclude that the vast majority 
of the work of state courts involves resolution of disputes between private parties on both 
sides of the litigation. Cases filed in federal court are much more likely to involve 
government parties either as plaintiffs or defendants, although federal filings are miniscule 
compared to state court filings. For instance, out of 276,937 civil cases filed in United States 
District Courts between October 2008 and September 2009, perhaps half may have involved 
government parties: 8,834 cases in which the United States was a plaintiff; 34,310 cases in 
which the United States was a defendant; 273 cases that involved a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a state statute; 41,000 cases that involved petitions by state prisoners; and 
about 34,000 cases classified as civil rights, some portion of which might involve state 
defendants. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 141–43 tbl.C-2 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness. 
aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
 19. Commentators now commonly characterize pleading, like summary judgment or 
Daubert determinations, as having a “gatekeeping” function. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 
1932; Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1217, 
1224 (2008); Schneider, supra note 16, at 527; Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of 
Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 94 (2008). 
 20. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 68–72; Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 
36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1094–95 (2009) (framing heightened pleading as a necessary balance 
to the high costs of discovery). But see John P. Sullivan, Twombly and Iqbal: The Latest 
Retreat from Notice Pleading, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 61 (2009) (criticizing the discovery 
abuse justification). 
 21. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 
1060 (2003). 
 22. The Twombly Court made clear that, precisely because of the high costs of 
discovery in antitrust actions, it made sense to weed out “anemic” cases through pleading 
rules rather than other case management devices. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
559–60 (2007). And in Iqbal, the Court was unwilling to “unlock the doors of discovery” to 
plaintiffs who had “nothing more than conclusions” to verify the merit of their claim. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). By contrast, the notice pleading standard 
articulated in Conley was famously agnostic on the ultimate merit of any particular claim. 
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (asking whether a claim would lie if 
allegations were proven and rejecting the argument that a complaint requires factual detail); 
see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) does not 
countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual 
allegations.”). Indeed, to the extent that Congress has relied on heightened pleading in 
particular kinds of cases, such as securities fraud cases, it has based that reliance on the 
assumption that heightened pleading standards can reduce meritless cases without deterring 
valid ones. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) (concluding that despite 
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of notice pleading combined with the high costs of discovery and litigation forces 
defendants to settle meritless lawsuits rather than defend against them to the hilt in 
court.23 Even a few critics of the Iqbal/Twombly heightened pleading standard tend 
to assume that there is a rational motivation for raising pleading standards, in order 
to better filter out meritless suits, even if they disagree with it for other reasons.24 
There is, however, no empirical basis supporting the assumption that heightened 
pleading standards—either the plausibility standard ushered in by Iqbal and 
Twombly or the closely related “fact pleading” standard25 that has always lurked as 
a competitor to notice pleading—are more efficient filters than Conley’s notice 
pleading standard. Other than in the specific area of securities fraud litigation,26 
there has been no empirical inquiry into the connection between what I will 
(without any claim to originality27) refer to as “thin” pleading and the ultimate 
                                                                                                                 
Congress’s intent the PSLRA likely deterred the filing of a substantial number of 
meritorious cases). Nonetheless, the academic commentary regarding Iqbal and Twombly 
has routinely accepted the assumption that heightened pleading will mostly work to filter out 
meritless cases, not prematurely terminate valid ones. See Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 
22–23 (maintaining that plaintiff’s interest in cases like Twombly is minimal because it is 
unlikely plaintiff has a valid claim); Dodson, supra note 15, at 465 (citing efficiency goals as 
one justification for fact pleading); Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 165, 167 (listing heightened pleading as one approach for filtering “weak or 
frivolous cases”); Smith, supra note 20, at 1067; Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading 
Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 169 (2009) (suggesting that for certain kinds of cases 
heightened pleading can “reduce the cost disparities that can sometimes induce plaintiffs to 
file frivolous claims”). 
 23. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 (cost of discovery); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (expressing concern over abuse of discovery); Fairman, supra note 21, 
at 1059–60 (describing concern with frivolous cases imposing burdensome discovery as a 
principal judicial justification for heightened pleading); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of 
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 
(1986) (suggesting that heightened pleading is a response to litigation pressure and that there 
is a limited but valid place for using pleading to address the merits of particular kinds of 
litigation). Even those who are critics of Iqbal’s extension of Twombly are swayed, in part, 
by the idea that heightened pleading may be good medicine for certain kinds of cases. See 
Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 873 (2009) (arguing that there are some normative arguments in favor of limiting thin 
pleading, but adoption of rules that depart from notice pleading should be consistent with the 
statutory or rulemaking process and should be carefully tailored based on particular 
categories of cases). 
 24. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 15, at 98–99 (arguing for a limited role of the Twombly 
pleading standard, where there is heightened concern for weak or frivolous cases); Marcus, 
supra note 23, at 436; A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 18, 22 (2009) (acknowledging that the plausibility standard, “at least as stated,” 
vindicates the efficiency interest in screening out cases based on their likelihood of merit). 
As Spencer recognizes, however, there are other interests at stake in pleading, and 
plausibility pleading risks undermining those other interests. Spencer, supra, at 24–25. 
 25. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 444–51 (describing the revival of “fact pleading”). 
 26. See Choi, supra note 22.  
 27. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights 
Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 795 (1995) (questioning, from the perspective of client 
representation and narrative, use of “thin” pleadings in civil rights cases). 
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merit of a particular case.28 The existence of groundless assumptions which come 
to frame perceptions of litigation is nothing new,29 but in the context of a pleading 
standard it is extremely consequential. This Article seeks to begin to fill this gap by 
exploring the operating assumptions about the role of pleading in civil litigation. 
The data reported here suggest that the common wisdom among supporters of 
heightened pleading along the lines of Iqbal and Twombly cannot be supported 
empirically. Rules that subject thin pleadings to greater scrutiny and dismissal do 
not do a better job than notice pleading of filtering out meritless claims. In the 
absence of empirical evidence that contradicts the conclusions reached here, the 
recent move towards adoption of a plausibility pleading standard in all civil 
litigation bears further scrutiny. 
I emphasize the limited nature of these data because the empirical inquiry is 
quite complex. After all, cases that are dismissed under a heightened pleading 
regime cannot generally be followed to determine their ultimate merit: they have 
been dismissed and are therefore, absent amendment, lost to follow-up.30 Thus, I 
estimate the cost of heightened pleading standards through a novel empirical 
approach. By focusing on cases decided during a recent ten-year period (1990–
1999) in which the Conley notice pleading standard was ostensibly good law,31 I 
attempt to estimate the ultimate success of thinly pleaded cases. And by comparing 
this rate of success to the entire set of litigated cases over the same time period, I 
conclude that thinly pleaded cases are at least as successful as the generality of 
cases. Furthermore, for some types of cases, most surprisingly civil rights cases, 
thinly pleaded cases may achieve an even higher level of success than similar 
actions supported by more detailed or convincing pleadings. 
I also emphasize the somewhat narrow framework of the empirical project. The 
costs and benefits of litigation go beyond measurements of success. There may be 
significant costs to prematurely dismissing cases that will ultimately prove 
unsuccessful: some of these lawsuits provide important information to the public 
about disputed governmental and corporate conduct; some lack “merit” because of 
remedial limitations like qualified immunity or a statute of limitations, and not 
because of a lack of a legally cognizable harm. There also may be benefits to 
prematurely dismissing cases that will ultimately prove meritorious: some lawsuits 
will drain a significant amount of collective resources for sparse individual gain, 
through discovery costs and court time, for instance. But, given the empirical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See Clermont, supra note 16, at 1930–31 (observing that despite the longstanding 
controversy over pleading, there are no empirical studies “whatsoever on the virtues of case 
exposition through pleading”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1754, 1759–61 (1998) (finding a dearth of 
evidence related to the ultimate resolution of 12(b)(6) dismissals on appeal). 
 29. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 431, 453–56 (2004) 
(referring to debates about employment discrimination litigation). 
 30. Spencer, supra note 24, at 24 (“[I]t is unknowable whether a dismissed claim was 
nonetheless meritorious in an absolute sense.”). 
 31. As discussed below, even before Iqbal and Twombly, lower courts did not always 
hew to the most expansive reading of Conley. See infra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
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assumption that undergirds much of the support for heightened pleading standards, 
some empirical inquiry is appropriate. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I identifies the problem by reviewing 
the history of notice pleading in the United States, the development of alternative 
models of pleading, and the Supreme Court’s vacillation between traditional notice 
pleading and heightened pleading.32 Despite the important stakes and policy 
considerations in play, these debates have taken place without any consideration of 
empirical evidence. Part II describes the methodology of the study reported here. 
The paper uses a retrospective review of cases decided over the course of ten years, 
1990 to 1999, to isolate those cases that most likely would be vulnerable to 
dismissal under the Iqbal and Twombly pleading standard. After identifying these 
100-odd cases, I followed them to determine whether they achieved a successful 
resolution for the claimant. Part III reports and analyzes the data. In brief, the cases 
identified achieved significant success—more than half of the cases followed 
through the study resulted in a settlement or a plaintiff’s verdict. The level of 
success in the thinly pleaded cohort compares favorably to general success rates 
obtained from data provided by the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts (“Administrative Office”) and from independent research conducted by 
other scholars. This research suggests that thin pleading does not correlate with 
lack of merit. This conclusion is buttressed when one disaggregates the cases by 
type of litigation (civil rights, contracts, antitrust, etc.). Part IV considers the 
ramifications of these data and alternative explanations for the outcomes reported 
here, including various selection biases that could flow from the methodology. The 
bottom-line conclusion is that, to the extent advocates for heightened pleading 
believe that stricter pleading will be a better filter for merit than notice pleading, 
that assumption should be questioned. In the midst of the heated debate about the 
costs that notice pleading imposes upon defendants, this Article draws attention to 
the substantial costs imposed by heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs with 
meritorious claims. 
I. THE (RE)EMERGENCE OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS 
The changes ushered in by the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are hard to overstate. The Rules’ effect on pleading was particularly 
striking. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules, pleading was claim-specific and 
required adherence to technicalities that the drafters of the Rules sought to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. As Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell have observed, there is a marked 
difference, at least philosophically if not practically, between the plausibility pleading 
standard adopted by the Court in Twombly and Iqbal and the heightened fact pleading 
regime which was often trotted out as an alternative to Conley’s notice pleading regime in 
the 1990s. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 832–33. These differences are not 
material, however, to the data reported here, because both plausibility and detailed fact 
pleading regimes would operate to make thinly pleaded complaints more likely to be 
dismissed. See id. at 833 (“Because plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead particularized 
facts and maybe even some evidence, the federal pleading product will usually not look 
much different from a complaint in a heightened-fact-pleading regime.”). 
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eradicate.33 Rule 8, with its mandate that all a pleading requires is a “short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”34 was a 
sharp departure from prior practice.35 As has been recounted by numerous 
commentators, the transition from common law rules of pleading, to code pleading, 
to the notice pleading ushered in by the Federal Rules, represented a gradual but 
significant policy choice marked by reliance on discovery and trial to determine 
merit rather than technical rules of pleading.36 
This change was crystallized by the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. 
Gibson,37 in which the Court articulated an interpretation of Rule 8 that focused on 
the notice given to the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff’s lawsuit rather than 
on the relationship of particular pleaded facts to the legal claims at issue. The 
Court’s language, which would come to dominate pleading inquiries for several 
decades, treated pleading as a way of “facilitat[ing] a proper decision on the 
merits”38 by giving a defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests.”39 Although there are interesting and worthwhile 
debates about the extent to which Conley emerged from a debate about legal 
sufficiency of a complaint versus factual sufficiency of a complaint, lower courts 
and the Supreme Court consistently interpreted Conley as establishing a minimum 
factual threshold for complaints, rather than requiring complaints to conform to 
specific dictates of positive law.40  
Conley was a strange poster child for notice pleading—the plaintiffs had 
provided extensive factual detail, they had specified their legal claims, and neither 
party had briefed or addressed Rule 8, although the respondents did make reference 
to the “vague” allegations in the complaint.41 Indeed, the comments made to drafts 
of Justice Black’s opinion for a unanimous Court were minimal, and only Justices 
Harlan and Brennan seemed to be at all focused on the portion of the opinion that 
discussed the applicable pleading standard.42 Thus, the Supreme Court’s broad 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 438–40. 
 34. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 35. The goal of the Federal Rules was to create both simplicity and uniformity in 
pleading and to prevent premature dismissals. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 439 (“Rule 
8(a)(2) was drafted carefully to avoid use of the charged phrases ‘fact,’ ‘conclusion,’ and 
‘cause of action.’”). 
 36. E.g., Fairman, supra note 21, at 990–91; see also Sherwin, supra note 19, at 76–77 
(summarizing history of pleading standards and functions from medieval origins onward). 
For an overall history of the Federal Rules, see generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
 37. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 38. Id. at 48. 
 39. Id. at 47. 
 40. See Sherwin, supra note 19, at 78–83 (framing the issue as a debate between Legal 
Realists and legal formalists). 
 41. Brief for Respondents Pat J. Gibson, et. al. at 26, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87662, at *26; see Sherwin, supra note 19, at 89–90; see also 
Petitioner’s Brief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (No. 7), 1957 WL 87661.  
 42. See Memorandum from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Hugo Black (Nov. 13, 
1957) (on file with the author and available from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, 
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statement that a complaint should survive dismissal “unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him to 
relief,”43 resolved a heavily disputed issue relating to the meaning of Rule 8 
without significant input from the parties or other interested observers. But once so 
articulated, the notice pleading standard dominated the resolution of pre-discovery 
motions, at least rhetorically.44 Until Iqbal and Twombly, the Supreme Court had 
maintained a relatively consistent commitment to Conley’s notice pleading rule, 
twice unanimously rejecting heightened pleading standards in civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases.45 Admonishing lower courts to adhere to 
Conley’s liberal pleading standard, the Court specifically recognized that the 
purported justification for heightened pleading standards was to screen out 
unmeritorious suits.46 The Court even acknowledged that there might be “practical 
merits” to heightened fact pleading,47 but reminded the lower courts that such 
changes may be obtained only “‘by the process of amending the Federal Rules,’” 
not by judicial fiat.48 
Thus, one story to tell about the transition from Conley to Iqbal and Twombly is 
that of a Court which only recently lost faith in a notice pleading standard, perhaps 
as a result of judgments about the practicalities of modern litigation. But the 
Court’s embrace of notice pleading was not unwavering, as evidenced by its 
flirtation with heightened pleading well before Iqbal and Twombly. In 1983, for 
instance, the Court dropped a footnote in an antitrust case, Associated General 
                                                                                                                 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); Memorandum from Justice William J. Brennan to 
Justice Hugo Black (Nov. 15, 1957) (on file with the author and available from the 
Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). As a result 
of these suggestions, it appears that the following sentence was deleted from the penultimate 
paragraph of the decision: “Under the Rules the best cause, not the cleverest pleader, is to 
prevail.” See Printed and Circulated Draft Opinion (1st) at 7, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957) (circulated Nov. 13, 1957) (on file with the author and available from the Collections 
of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). The aspect of the draft 
that highlighted the minimum requirements imposed by Rule 8 was retained, however. See 
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
 43. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
 44. Christopher Fairman has argued that notice pleading has rarely been the rule, at least 
in practice, pointing to examples from antitrust, RICO, environmental, civil rights, 
intellectual property, and defamation cases, among others, in which lower courts have 
constructed a variety of heightened pleading standards. See Fairman, supra note 21, at 998–
1011 (summarizing different categories of heightened pleading). 
 45. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (explaining that 
discovery and summary judgment, not heightened pleading requirements, are the proper 
means for disposal of unmeritorious suits); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that the heightened 
pleading standard for § 1983 claims against municipalities is “impossible to square . . . with 
the liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”); see also Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that questions regarding 
pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most effectively 
resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”). 
 46. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514–15; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168. 
 47. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. 
 48. Id. (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168). 
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Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,49 that 
some lower courts took to invite a heightened pleading standard for certain aspects 
of antitrust claims.50 And in Siegert v. Gilley,51 Justice Kennedy suggested that 
heightened pleading standards may be an appropriate judicial tool for 
accommodating the qualified immunity defense, available to government officials 
sued for damages.52 Given the Court’s own seeming ambivalence about Conley—at 
least in particular categories of cases like antitrust and civil rights—one can better 
understand lower courts’ willingness to announce temporary departures from a pure 
notice pleading standard.53 
Any such ambivalence seems to have evaporated with the Court’s 
announcement of its decisions in Iqbal and Twombly. In the former, the Court 
adopted a “plausibility” standard in an antitrust case, expressing its concern, 
specifically in the antitrust context, that liberal pleading rules, combined with 
expansive discovery, would pressure defendants to settle weak or meritless cases.54 
Twombly also overruled at least the portion of Conley that cautioned district courts 
not to dismiss a case for insufficient pleading unless the court can conclude that 
“the plaintiff can prove no set of facts” consistent with the defendant’s liability.55 
The Court’s decision in Iqbal closed a theoretical door, left open in Twombly, by 
making it clear that plausibility pleading applied in all civil cases, not just antitrust 
claims.56 Iqbal also articulated a two-step process for evaluating the sufficiency of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983). 
 50. Fairman, supra note 21, at 1013–14; see id. at 1013–14 nn.173–78. 
 51. 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
 52. Id. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Fairman, supra note 21, at 997 & 
nn.79–81 (summarizing aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence in which commitment to notice 
pleading wavered). 
 53. At various times, some circuit courts adopted heightened pleading standards in civil 
rights cases. E.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 1997); Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Babb v. Dorman, 33 
F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 865 F. Supp. 789 (M.D. Ala. 1994), 
rev’d on other grounds, 102 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997). By the time that Twombly was 
announced, however, most circuit courts had recognized that their heightened pleading 
standards could not survive the Supreme Court’s decisions in Leatherman, Crawford-El, and 
Swierkiewicz. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard for qualified immunity cases had been 
overruled in 1995); Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(overruling cases which applied heightened pleading standard to civil rights claims); Goad v. 
Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (overruling Veney in light of Crawford-El); 
Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001) (overruling Breidenbach in light of 
Crawford-El); Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that 
Crawford-El rejected the D.C. Circuit’s heightened pleading standard). But see Dalrymple v. 
Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir. 2003) (continuing to apply heightened pleading to civil 
rights claims). Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Iqbal to reject a heightened 
pleading standard for civil rights claims. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 710 (11th Cir. 
2010). 
 54. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007). 
 55. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63. 
 56. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009). 
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a complaint.57 First, courts must review each allegation in a complaint and exclude 
from consideration those allegations that are stated in a “conclusory” fashion.58 In 
and of itself, this was not new; what was new was the Court’s holding that 
allegations of state of mind, despite the explicit language of Rule 9(b),59 must be 
alleged with some factual detail.60 The second step, the plausibility analysis, 
assesses the fit between the nonconclusory facts alleged and the relief claimed.61 
Iqbal made it clear that the judge’s role in plausibility analysis was one that called 
for the exercise of “judicial experience and common sense,”62 a surprising turn 
from the judicial role contemplated in Conley.63 
In both Iqbal and Twombly the Court disclaimed any intent to adopt a 
heightened fact pleading standard,64 and lower courts are confused as to the precise 
ramifications of the cases.65 This confusion does not lessen the need to evaluate the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Under Rule 9(b), “conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 9(b). 
 60. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50. 
 61. Id. at 1950. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957). 
 64. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 65. For example, there is a broad dispute over whether “general” allegations of state of 
mind are sufficient on their own. Compare, e.g., Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, 682 F. 
Supp. 2d 179, 187–88 (D.P.R. 2010) (general allegations of defendants’ state of mind found 
sufficient); Capps v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. CV 09-752-PK, 2009 WL 5149135, at *1 
(D. Or. Dec. 28, 2009) (general allegations assumed to include specific facts necessary to 
support them); Young v. Speziale, No. 07-03129, 2009 WL 3806296, at *6–9 (D.N.J. Nov. 
10, 2009) (general allegations may be sufficient in deliberate indifference context.), with 
First Med. Health Plan, Inc. v. CaremarkPCS Caribbean, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117–20 
(D.P.R. 2010) (general allegation of state of mind insufficient); Fabian v. Dunn, No. SA-08-
cv-269-X9, 2009 WL 2567866, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (allegation that 
defendants acted with deliberate indifference is conclusory). Courts also differ over whether 
an allegation that a defendant “knew” or was “aware” of a particular fact is conclusory or 
factual. Compare, e.g., Jones v. Hashagen, No. 4:09-CV-889, 2010 WL 128316, at *4 (M.D. 
Pa. Jan. 12, 2010) (plaintiff’s allegation that the superintendent “failure to take action to curb 
Inmate Mitchell’s pattern of assaults, known or should have been known to [him], [and] 
constituted deliberate indifference” is conclusory (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 674 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211–13 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(allegation that District “knew of” specific systemic problems with medical care in prisons 
was conclusory); Kasten v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-11754, 2009 WL 3628012, at *6 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (allegation of defendant’s awareness insufficient without some 
statement of source of awareness); Choate v. Merrill, No. 08-24-B-W, 2009 WL 3487768, at 
*6 (D. Me. Oct. 20, 2009) (in Eighth Amendment case, allegation of supervisor’s knowledge 
of and indifference to lack of adequate life-saving equipment and training was conclusory); 
Garvins v. Hofbauer, No. 2:09-cv-48, 2009 WL 1874074, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 26, 2009) 
(allegation that defendants were “aware” of plaintiff’s medical condition insufficient to state 
claim for deliberate indifference), with Mallinckrodt Inc. v. E-Z-Em Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 
563, 569 (D. Del. 2009) (in patent case, the plaintiff satisfied the pleading standard for an 
infringement claim by alleging that defendant “became aware” of patent “shortly after” its 
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benefits and disadvantages of heightened pleading standards. After all, the 
transition to heightened pleading has been a long time in the making. Even as the 
Court was consistently rejecting fact pleading standards in the 1990s and early 
2000s, Congress, in 1995, chose to impose higher pleading standards in the 
securities litigation context.66 And prior to Iqbal and Twombly the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee spent numerous meetings discussing potential adjustments to 
notice pleading, usually opting to postpone any action in part because lower courts 
seemed to be demanding more rigorous pleading despite the Supreme Court’s 
contrary pre-Twombly holdings.67 Other than Stephen Choi’s notable work 
regarding securities litigation,68 and though heightened pleading standards are back 
in vogue to a certain extent, there has been no empirical inquiry into their 
effectiveness in filtering out meritless claims. It is to this question that I now turn. 
                                                                                                                 
issuance and that defendants “actively induced” infringing acts); Decker v. Borough of 
Hughestown, No. 3:09-cv-1463, 2009 WL 4406142, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2009) 
(allegation that defendants “knew or should have known of plaintiff’s right to express 
himself in such a manner” was sufficient to support failure to train claim in First 
Amendment Monell case (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jordon, No. 
1:09CV21, 2009 WL 3718883, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2009) (Fourth Amendment claim 
sufficient where complaint alleged that “Defendant Robinson . . . arrested Plaintiff without 
probable cause and that Defendants knew there was no probable cause”); Smith v. 
Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 07-3150, 2009 WL 2601253, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 
2009) (allegation of sheriff’s knowledge that he had housed plaintiff with a violent inmate 
was not conclusory); Vaden v. Campbell, No. 4:09cv12-RH, 2009 WL 1919474, at *3 (N.D. 
Fla. July 2, 2009) (allegation of sheriff’s knowledge of deputy’s propensity for sexual 
assault was not conclusory); Schoppell v. Schrader, No. 1:08-CV-284, 2009 WL 1886090, at 
*5–7 (N.D. Ind. June 30, 2009) (allegation that county council was on notice that jail was 
inadequately funded and understaffed, and that another inmate had died because of 
inadequate medical care, sufficient to state § 1983 claim based on inadequate funding). 
Limitations of space and time prevent me from providing all of the examples of the differing 
interpretations that lower courts have adopted when applying Iqbal and Twombly. 
 66. See Choi, supra note 22, at 603. 
 67. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes 37–38 (May 22–23, 2006), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf; 
Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes 30 (Oct. 27–28, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf. 
Indeed, the Advisory Committee’s reference to the possibility of emphasizing “the often 
forgotten words: ‘showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’” eerily foreshadows the 
Supreme Court’s own heightened attention to those words in Iqbal. Compare Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee Minutes 31 (Oct. 27–28, 2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf, 
with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (finding a difference between alleging an entitlement to relief 
and “showing” such an entitlement).  
 68. Choi, supra note 22. Choi’s study does not purport to determine the outcome of 
thinly pleaded cases; rather, it uses publicly available information to estimate the degree to 
which the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), has deterred the filing of valid 
securities fraud cases. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
As described above, the goal of this paper is to hazard a prediction of one of the 
costs, as measured by dismissals of meritorious cases, of imposing the 
Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard in all civil cases. There are many different ways 
to estimate the effects of such a rule. The ideal means would be to identify all cases 
dismissed as a result of the Iqbal/Twombly standard, independently assess the 
dismissed complaints for the merit of their underlying claims, and compare the 
distribution of merit in that set of cases with the distribution of merit in claims that 
survive the application of plausibility pleading standards. The impossibility of 
achieving this level of omniscience should be evident from the outset.69 Instead, we 
are left with many different imperfect approaches, a typical problem in empirical 
inquiries. 
Some observers have focused on the differences in dismissal rates pre-Twombly, 
pre-Iqbal, and post-Iqbal.70 The purpose of such study is to estimate whether 
application of Iqbal and Twombly is resulting in more dismissals of cases at the 
pleading stage.71 This approach, while important and useful, has many significant 
disadvantages. First, as noted above, because cases are dismissed, one has no way 
of knowing whether the dismissals were “false negatives” or not.72 Second, the rate 
of dismissal is of limited utility if defendants are emboldened by decisions like 
Iqbal to bring motions to dismiss in contexts where they never would have been 
considered in the past.73 Thus, although the rate of dismissal may stay the same (or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See Spencer, supra note 24, at 24. 
 70. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (estimating that motions to dismiss were 
four times more likely to be granted after Iqbal as they were during the Conley era, after 
controlling for relevant variables); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A 
Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1011, 1014 (showing effect of Twombly standard on published opinions regarding 
employment discrimination cases); Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? 
A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1837 (2008) (reporting a civil rights dismissal rate of 41.7% under the 
pre-Twombly standard and 52.9% under Twombly, using only reported cases between 2006 
and 2007); Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 12. 
 71. At last count, Iqbal had been cited in more than fourteen thousand decisions, but 
this does not tell us much about its impact. After all, most courts are presumably citing Iqbal 
because it is the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing pleading. 
 72. By “false negative,” I mean only that the dismissing body incorrectly assessed the 
ultimate merit of the complaint. I recognize that most advocates of heightened pleading do 
not explicitly maintain that courts should be judging the merits of a case at the pleading 
stage; however, as described above, most heightened pleading supporters assume that it will 
be most effective in dismissing cases that have no merit. See supra text accompanying notes 
19–23. 
 73. This was the instinct of an experienced judge from the Northern District of Illinois 
who, during an oral argument of a motion to dismiss, expressed the view that defense 
counsel were overstating Iqbal. See Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Milton 
I. Shadur at 2, Madison v. City of Chicago, No. 09 C 3629 (Aug. 10, 2009). Judge Shadur 
also has referred to the defense bar’s penchant for summary judgment motions as 
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even decrease) after a case like Iqbal, this could obscure the fact that a broader 
range of cases are being subject to dismissal than before. Finally, using only 
published opinions to examine changes in the rate of dismissal, as some scholars 
have done, creates potentially serious problems of selection bias.74 
This paper takes a different approach by looking backwards at a subset of cases 
litigated during the Conley era. Much like a retrospective cohort study, used by 
epidemiologists to study the relationship between a particular exposure and a health 
outcome, the design I use here seeks to identify whether there is a relationship 
between sparse pleading and the merit of a case (as measured by the case’s ultimate 
outcome).75 The methodology was comprised of three steps: first, I looked to 
appellate cases decided during the years 1990 to 1999 to identify a set of cases in 
which the pleadings would likely be subject to dismissal under an Iqbal/Twombly 
standard, but which were considered sufficient under Conley’s liberal rule; second, 
I followed those cases after they had been remanded to the district court to 
determine their ultimate resolution, generating an estimate of the “success”76 of 
thinly pleaded cases during this time period; and third, I compared the rate of 
success in the thinly pleaded cases I identified with the success of all cases litigated 
during the same time period for which there are records supplied by the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“Administrative Office”). Each 
of these steps has specific methodological considerations and difficulties. 
The process of identifying cases in which the pleadings are particularly thin is 
amenable to several approaches. Perhaps the most comprehensive would be to 
review all district court case files, or a representative sample, and subject the 
pleadings to a de novo reading by civil procedure experts. This methodology, while 
offering the potential for inclusiveness, was rejected because it poses certain 
interpretive problems, particularly with regard to how to decide exactly how “thin” 
a pleading is. In addition, because this approach does not account for judicial 
                                                                                                                 
“Pavlovian,” so perhaps it should be no surprise that he is concerned that motions to dismiss 
will become similarly routine. See Milton I. Shadur, An Old Judge’s Thoughts, CBA 
RECORD (Chi. B. Ass’n, Chi., Ill.), Jan. 2004, at 27, 27. 
 74. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 839 n.66 (detailing potential selection 
bias in the Hatamyar, Seiner, and Hannon studies).  
 75. See generally CHARLES H. HENNEKENS & JULIE E. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN 
MEDICINE 153–56 (Sherry L. Mayrent ed., 1987) (providing a general discussion of the use 
of cohort studies in epidemiology). In brief, a retrospective cohort study attempts to 
determine the relationship between an exposure and a disease by looking at exposed and 
unexposed individuals and calculating the prevalence of a particular health outcome in each 
group. Id. at 154. In prospective studies, researchers follow exposed and unexposed 
individuals, sometimes tightly controlling the level of exposure, and determine health 
outcomes. Id. at 154–55. In case-control studies, researchers first identify individuals with 
and without disease and then determine the level of exposure to a particular determinant 
within each group. Id. at 156. 
 76. The difficulty of settling on a precise measure of success is discussed in more detail 
below, see infra text accompanying notes 93–102, 146–59, but compared to most empirical 
studies, I have defined success narrowly as either a judgment or a settlement. See, e.g., 
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The 
Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 719, 726–27 (1988) (including voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to 
prosecute, along with settlements and judgments, as successful outcomes). 
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perceptions of thinness, this methodology would most likely fail to capture the 
feature of Iqbal that depends on judges’ assessments of plausibility, based on their 
common sense and judicial experience. 
Instead of a randomized or comprehensive case selection process, I attempted to 
use a search method that would identify that subset of cases most likely to be 
vulnerable to dismissal based on the pleading principles articulated in Iqbal and 
Twombly. Such cases were identified in the following manner. First, I reviewed 
every appellate case announced between January 1, 1990, and January 1, 2000, in 
which Conley was cited as authority for any proposition.77 Of these cases, those in 
which a motion to dismiss had been granted in the lower court were selected for 
study. Those cases in which the dismissal was affirmed were not considered, 
because there is no way of determining their ultimate merit, similar to the 
previously mentioned difficulty in determining the impact of Iqbal and Twombly. 
Of those cases in which the dismissal was reversed, care was taken to identify 
whether the basis for reversal was a ground that would be in jeopardy because of 
the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard. For instance, if an appellate court reversed 
because the district court had disregarded an allegation as being too conclusory due 
to the fact that it simply mirrored the elements of a cause of action, the case was 
considered part of the cohort.78 If a dismissal was reversed because the appellate 
court stated that the district court considered alternative explanations for the 
conduct at issue that were not found in the complaint, the case was considered to be 
part of the cohort.79 Similarly, if a dismissal was reversed because the complaint 
contained a bald allegation of state of mind or conspiracy, with no other factual 
support, it was included in the cohort.80 And finally, if the appellate court relied on 
the language from Conley that Twombly unceremoniously “retired”—that is, that a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. I used Westlaw’s KeyCite function to accomplish this. I included both published 
and unpublished appellate decisions in the sample. 
 78. See, e.g., Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 
1997) (reversing dismissal in employment discrimination claim where plaintiff’s complaint 
was “inartfully crafted, [but] in light of the liberal pleading standards, . . . presents an 
adequate claim of sex discrimination”). This approach to resolving pleading questions seems 
to be called into question by Iqbal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 79. See, e.g., Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992) (“In this 
case the district court did not consider any potential legal issues which arise from 
[plaintiff]’s allegations. Instead, it foreclosed legal analysis by concluding that the 
allegations were false, and it based this determination on [defendant]’s testimony at the 
telephonic evidentiary hearing.”). These cases were included in the cohort because under 
Iqbal, district courts are encouraged to rely on their “judicial experience and common sense” 
to consider alternative explanations for the conduct alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint, even if 
such explanations are found outside of the pleadings. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 80. See, e.g., In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 350 (11th Cir. 1996); Atchinson v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding allegation of municipal liability under 
§ 1983 sufficient where plaintiff alleged a single instance of misconduct and a conclusory 
allegation of failure to train). These allegations were sufficient under Conley but are almost 
certainly now insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (rejecting 
the argument that state of mind allegations can be made generally); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007) (holding that bare allegation of conspiracy is 
insufficient without more to establish this element of an antitrust claim). 
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reviewing court was to imagine whether the plaintiff could prove “any set of facts” 
consistent with liability prior to dismissal—it was included in the study.81 Each of 
these determinations was difficult to make and decisions at the borders would 
surely invite debate.82 
There were many reasons to use this method of case selection. First, it was 
assumed that an appellate court’s citation of Conley was meant to emphasize the 
notice aspect of Rule 8 pleading, given Conley’s standing at the time. Presumably, 
one could have looked to appellate cases that cited other authority also associated 
with notice pleading—for example, Hishon v. King & Spalding83 or Cruz v. 
Beto84—but Conley has long been a symbol of notice pleading;85 there is no reason 
to think that there would be a merits-based difference between cases that elicit an 
appellate court to cite Conley in support of reversal as opposed to some other notice 
pleading precedent.86 At the same time, not every citation of Conley indicates that 
the appellate decision would be in tension with the Iqbal/Twombly rule. Thus, close 
review of the appellate court’s decision-making process was necessary to 
specifically identify those cases in tension with Iqbal and Twombly. Importantly, 
the review of these cases for their inclusion in the cohort was performed prior to 
conducting any follow-up of the cases on remand. This mitigates any concern that 
the initial review for inclusion in the cohort was not “blind” to outcome.87 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63. 
 82. For instance, if an appellate court referred to the “any set of facts” language but 
addressed the legal status of a particular cause of action rather than the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, the case was not considered part of the cohort. See, e.g., Enweremadu v. Reichlin, 
No. 92-1845, 1993 WL 311914, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 8, 1993) (holding that the district court 
erred in dismissing the action because the complaint cited only the Fourth Amendment and 
not the Fourteenth Amendment). In any event, anyone wishing to test the validity of the 
judgments made about each case can review the cases as they are clearly identified below. 
See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 83. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
 84. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). 
 85. This is reflected in citation counts for the three cases. According to Westlaw’s 
KeyCite feature, over the specified time period, Cruz was cited in 108 appellate decisions, 
Hishon was cited in almost 250 appellate cases, and Conley was cited in 867 appellate cases. 
If one limits the citations to pleading-related headnotes (which is admittedly putting a high 
degree of faith in Westlaw’s editors), Cruz was cited in 38 cases, Hishon in 197, and Conley 
in 845. 
 86. There might, of course, be a difference in the kind of case that elicits a Conley 
citation versus, say, a Cruz citation. Conley was a discrimination case, and Cruz was a 
prisoners’ rights case. Therefore, one might expect that appellate courts considering prisoner 
appeals would be more likely to cite Cruz than Conley in support of reversal. This difference 
might affect the proportion of prison cases in the sample, but there is no reason to think that 
prisoner cases that elicit a Conley citation are more or less likely to be meritorious than 
prisoner cases that elicit a Cruz citation. Nonetheless, for future research it might be useful 
to include appellate decisions citing to Cruz and Hishon, if only to increase the sample size. 
 87. One should always attempt to minimize observation bias in empirical studies, and 
“blinding” researchers to outcomes is one approach to such minimization. See HENNEKENS 
& BURING, supra note 75, at 192 (discussing blinding in the context of health intervention 
studies). 
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It would be possible to expand the cohort by adding all district court decisions 
in which a motion to dismiss was denied in the first instance, and in which 
Conley’s disfavored language was cited by the district court.88 Including these 
cases may be more comprehensive and eliminate some of the selection biases that 
might pervade the focus on appellate courts.89 On the other hand, because the cases 
that will be dismissed under the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard will likely be on 
the margins of what was considered sufficient pleading under Conley, selecting 
cases through appellate reversals has the advantage of identifying cases in which 
judicial actors disagreed about the sufficiency of the pleading under Conley. In any 
event, the results reported here argue in favor of broader testing of the empirical 
inquiry, whether through expanding the cohort of appellate cases examined or 
through direct sampling from district court cases. 
Once the cohort was identified, the second methodological step was to 
determine the ultimate outcome of all cases included in the cohort. As a technical 
matter, this was relatively straightforward. I consulted electronic dockets 
maintained by the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER)90 website, 
which recorded most outcomes, and when necessary I contacted specific attorneys 
or litigants to clarify lingering uncertainties. Cases were divided into the following 
outcome categories: (1) judge or jury verdict, (2) settlement, (3) stipulated 
dismissal, (4) summary judgment, (5) involuntary dismissal, and (6) other.91 No 
distinction was made between judge and jury verdicts, because the presumption of 
the study is that a fact finder’s conclusion is dispositive of the merits of the case.92 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Such cases would be identified not by using appellate decisions as a filter, but by 
searching district court opinions directly. 
 89. See infra Part IV.C. 
 90. PACER Serv. Ctr., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER: PUB. ACCESS TO 
COURT ELEC. RECORDS, http://www.pacer.gov/.  
 91. In addition to coding the cases for outcome, coding was made for the following 
categories: circuit, district, year of filing, year of resolution, pro se status on appeal, pro se 
status on remand, case type (by Administrative Office code), and case type (descriptive). 
The code for case type consisted of the following categories: antitrust, civil rights 
(nonprisoner), civil rights (prisoner), consumer, contract, employment discrimination, 
ERISA, RICO, securities fraud, and tort. Only nine cases could not be coded according to 
these categories and were lumped together as “other.” 
 92. This presumption is subject to dispute, and some have certainly argued that juries 
are not reliable fact finders. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, The Medical Malpractice 
Imbroglio: A Non-Adversarial Suggestion, 78 KY. L.J. 293, 294 (1990) (criticizing 
malpractice juries for basing verdicts on sympathy for injured party); David E. Bernstein, 
Learning the Wrong Lessons from “An American Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-
Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1975 (2006) (expressing 
concern regarding the role played by juror sympathies in cases involving birth defects); Peter 
A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are “Immature” Tort Claims Appropriate 
for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 213, 222–23 (1998) (describing ways 
juries can be misled in toxic tort cases). But see ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE 
AMERICAN TRIAL 31 (2009) (“The moral sources that are actualized at trial exist in the life 
world of the jurors. They are the negotiated truths that made a certain way of life possible. 
They are not arbitrary; neither is a decision derived from them, duly actualized and refined. 
Least of all is it ‘purely emotional.’”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The 
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The settlement and stipulated dismissal categories are relatively straightforward. 
However, it should be noted that, while most empirical studies categorize stipulated 
dismissals and voluntary dismissals together for the purposes of judging ultimate 
success,93 this study has not. Only judgments for the plaintiff, settlements, or 
stipulated dismissals are considered successful resolutions in this study, because in 
each of these circumstances there is the assurance (or the strong indication) that a 
plaintiff has received something of value through litigation. Efforts were made in 
every case to confirm, by personal communication with counsel or a litigant, 
whether stipulated dismissals in fact represented settlements by another name. But 
the underlying assumption is that a settlement is a successful outcome, and that 
successful outcomes are suggestive of merit.94 
Reliance on settlement as reflecting the merit of a lawsuit is not without its 
risks. There are many who argue that some percentage of settlements are coercive 
and are not indicative of the underlying merit of the plaintiff’s position.95 On the 
other hand, some researchers quite reasonably maintain that counting settlements 
and verdicts but not including voluntary dismissals ignores the arguably safe 
assumption that a plaintiff would not agree to dismiss a case without obtaining 
something of value in return.96 The view that settlements are often the result of 
                                                                                                                 
Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
33, 78 (2003) (defending the need for a jury even in the face of criticisms that verdicts are 
the product of emotion and sympathy). For those who believe that jury verdicts are often the 
product of irrationality, it is doubtful that any indication of success would be a satisfactorily 
reliable correlate of merit. Indeed, it is unlikely that any aspect of the project undertaken in 
this Article would seem worthwhile to one who discounts all jury verdicts as the product of 
irrationality. 
 93. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1592–93 
(2003); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 726–27. 
 94. There may be many reasons that a defendant enters into a settlement agreement, 
some of which reflect a judgment about merit and some of which reflect other concerns. See 
infra notes 148–55 and accompanying text. 
 95. See, e.g., Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for 
Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 663, 684–85 (1993) (distinguishing between just and 
unjust settlements, with the latter the result of coercion such as unequal bargaining power). 
Much of the academic commentary has focused on class action litigation. See, e.g., John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency 
in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1987); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of 
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 373, 387–88 (2005) (describing class action decertification decisions that are motivated 
in part by concern that certification will leave defendants with no choice but to settle). Some 
commentators have used strong language indeed, comparing settlements obtained after 
certification decisions to blackmail. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and 
“Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1377 (2000). But see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 
37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 840 (2004) (suggesting that settlement of recent employment class 
action discrimination claims was driven by “strong evidence on the merits”).  
 96. Compare Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 727–28 (explaining, with caveats, 
reliance on voluntary dismissals), with Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and 
Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational 
Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1309–11 (2005) 
[hereinafter Hadfield, Civil Litigation] (auditing Administrative Office coding of voluntary 
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coercion is founded at least in part on the assumption that plaintiffs often file suit 
for trivial or nonexistent grievances, in the hope of obtaining a favorable settlement 
without expending substantial cost.97 This assumption, however, is inconsistent 
with social science data that suggest that the vast majority, approaching ninety 
percent, of legally cognizable grievances are never brought to court.98 It is thus fair 
to assume that the disputes in which litigation is initiated often reflect grievances 
that are perceived to be real and worthy of the high cost of litigation. There are also 
good reasons to think that those cases that are settled are mostly cases in which 
there is substantial agreement between the parties as to the likely outcome of the 
case were it to litigate to judgment, at least where the parties have a relatively 
accurate sense of the damages that are at stake.99 This is particularly true for cases 
that are settled after discovery has terminated, because in that posture, both parties 
have access to the full spectrum of information that will likely be produced at 
trial.100 
In some sense, I can be agnostic on whether settlements are reflective of the 
validity of a claim. I have, in the past, used voluntary dismissals as a relevant 
indication of success,101 and there is merit in doing so.102 My agnosticism is driven 
more by the fact that, however one defines success, any comparisons should be 
made using the same measure. Thus, what indicator one uses for success is less 
important than ensuring that one uses the same indicators of success across the two 
comparison cohorts.103 
                                                                                                                 
and other dismissals and finding that they are not closely correlated with settlements) and 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, 
and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) [hereinafter Hadfield, Trials] (finding errors in general 
Administrative Office coding). 
 97. See generally Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value 
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 & n.1 
(2004) (summarizing literature and stating that “[t]o employ a nuisance-value strategy, a 
litigant asserts a plainly meritless claim or defense in order to extract a payoff based on the 
cost the other party would incur to have the claim or defense dismissed by the court under a 
standard dispositive motion, like summary judgment”). 
 98. David M. Trubek, Austin Sarat, William L.F. Felstiner, Herbert M. Kritzer & Joel 
B. Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 86–87 (1983) (relying 
on study of disputes in “eight selected general areas—tort, consumer, debt, discrimination, 
property, government, post-divorce and landlord-tenant”). See generally ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (describing a 
system of informal dispute resolution in the cattle industry); Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 
60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (remarking that most disputes are resolved without a lawsuit 
being filed). 
 99. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 119, 138 (2002). 
 100. Most of the settlements or stipulated dismissals in the cohort of cases studied here 
took place after discovery was complete. See infra notes 152–54 and accompanying text. 
 101. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its 
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 833 (2010).  
 102. See, e.g., Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 727–28. 
 103. This principle only goes so far. It is hard to consider a case that is transferred to 
another district as successful or unsuccessful, at least in the sense that one means to study 
something about the merit of the claims being transferred. 
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This brings me to the final step of the analysis: comparing the rate of success in 
this cohort with the general rate of success among all cases resolved during this 
time period. The principal source of comparison—the “control” group, for lack of a 
better term—was created from the Administrative Office’s database of civil cases 
terminated between 1990 and 2000.104 There are well-discussed problems with 
relying solely on the Administrative Office’s database,105 so I have supplemented 
the Administrative Office data with more specific and arguably more reliable data 
generated by other researchers.106 In addition to comparing success rates at a cohort 
and control-wide level, I also make comparisons based on pro se status and case 
subject matter. 
III. RESULTS 
This section reviews the results of the study in two sections. First, I present the 
data relevant to the cohort in Part A. In Part B, I discuss the principal “control” 
group, the data gathered by the Administrative Office between 1990 and 2000. 
Throughout, I discuss the relevant comparisons between the two groups, 
supplemented by data provided by other researchers. 
A. Cohort Characteristics 
Of a total of 843 appellate decisions in which Conley was cited by a court, 745 
involved decisions reviewing a motion to dismiss determination by a district 
court.107 In 303 of these cases, the appellate court reversed the decision below and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970–2000 
(computer file, on file with the author), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08429. 
The database (in its entirety or a selected portion) can be downloaded from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research. After downloading only the civil 
terminations files from 1990 to 2000 (datasets 73, 74, 86, 87, 88, 98, 103, 104, 115, 116, and 
117), I converted the text files for use in Stata/SE 10.1 and generated the data that I will 
describe below. The Administrative Office data, being both expansive and publicly 
available, are not included in the Appendix, but the converted files I used for analysis are 
available on request. Eisenberg and Clermont also offer a useful online service that permits 
users to run certain queries of the database. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, 
JUDICIAL STATISTICAL INQUIRY, http://legal1.cit.cornell.edu:8090/.  
 105. See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1455, 1460 (2003); Hadfield, Civil Litigation, supra note 96, at 1310–11; Schlanger, supra 
note 93, at 1600 n.129. 
 106. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 107. Federal Circuit cases were excluded from consideration because of the specialized 
nature of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (defining the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit); 
Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=144&Itemid=27 (reporting that more 
than half of Federal Circuit cases involve administrative law, 31% involve intellectual 
property, and 11% involve damages claims against the United States government). Between 
1990 and 1999, only twenty-three appellate cases in which Conley was cited came from the 
Federal Circuit, and only nineteen of these involved appeals of disposition of motions to 
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remanded for further proceedings. There are moderate to extreme variations in 
reversal rates by circuit and year of decision, as reflected in Tables 1 and 2. Fisher 
exact testing108 was conducted comparing reversal rates within each circuit to the 
reversal rate of all other circuits combined, with the First, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits reporting significantly lower reversal rates and the Second, Third, 
and Eleventh Circuits reporting significantly higher reversal rates.109 When one 
considers reversal rates by year, there is less variation, with reversal rates in 1990 
being significantly lower than all other years combined, and reversal rates in 1992 
being significantly higher.110 
 
Table 1: Reversal Rates, by Circuit111 
 
Jurisdiction Reversed (%) Affirmed (%) Total 
Supreme Court 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 3 
First Circuita 8 (25%) 24 (75%) 32 
Second Circuita 53 (60.23%) 35 (39.77%) 88 
Third Circuit b 9 (64.29%) 5 (35.71%) 14 
Fourth Circuit 18 (41.86%) 25 (58.14%) 43 
Fifth Circuit 21 (33.33%) 42 (66.67%) 63 
Sixth Circuita 27 (31.03 %) 60 (68.97%) 87 
Seventh Circuita 64 (35.16%) 118 (64.84%) 182 
Eighth Circuit 17 (43.59%) 22 (56.41%) 39 
Ninth Circuit 36 (47.37%) 40 (52.63%) 76 
Tenth Circuita 18 (27.69%) 47 (72.31%) 65 
Eleventh Circuita 16 (59.26%) 11 (40.74%) 27 
D.C. Circuit 13 (50%) 13 (50%) 26 
Total 303 (40.67%) 442 (59.33%) 745 
a: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed; b: t<0.10, Fisher exact probability test 
                                                                                                                 
dismiss. Of these nineteen, ten of the circuit decisions vacated or reversed a lower court 
decision dismissing a complaint. 
 108. Where feasible, Fisher exact testing is usually preferable to estimating variance by 
chi-square testing. Robert Timothy Reagan, Federal Judicial Center Statistical Examples 
Software Prototype: Age Discrimination Example, 42 JURIMETRICS 281, 288 (2002). 
 109. Clermont and others have reported some variation in reversal rates by circuit in 
employment discrimination cases over a similar time frame. Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 561 Display 7 (2003).  
 110. See infra Table 2; infra Figure 2. There is no obvious explanation for these 
differences; there was no intervening legal change or Supreme Court decision between 1990 
and 1992 that would explain a significantly higher reversal rate in the latter. 
 111. Excluded from consideration are cases in which dismissals were not considered on appeal. 
Thus, if Conley were cited in reviewing a jury verdict or summary judgment, it was not included in 
the analysis of this study. Overall, only ninety-seven cases fell into this category, or 11.5%. There 
was some variation by circuit: in the Supreme Court, three cases (50%) were not pleading cases, 
one in the First Circuit (3.03%), seven in the Second (7.37%), six in the Third (30%), seven in the 
Fourth (14%), eleven in the Fifth (14.86%), six in the Sixth (6.45%), ten in the Seventh (5.21%), 
two in the Eighth (4.88%), twenty in the Ninth (20.83%), nine in the Tenth (12.16%), ten in the 
11th (27.03%), and five in the D.C. Circuit (16.13%). 
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Table 2. Reversal Rates, by Year 
 
Year Reversed (%) Affirmed (%) Total 
1990a 15 (27.27%) 40 (72.73%) 55 
1991 33 (37.08%) 56 (62.92%) 89 
1992a 32 (51.61%) 30 (48.39%) 62 
1993 39 (42.39%) 53 (57.61%) 92 
1994 44 (45.36%) 53 (54.64%) 97 
1995 31 (39.74%) 47 (60.26%) 78 
1996 23 (41.07%) 33 (58.93%) 56 
1997 27 (45%) 33 (55%) 60 
1998 33 (41.77%) 46 (58.23%) 79 
1999 26 (33.77%) 51 (66.23%) 77 
Total 303 (40.67%) 442 (59.33%) 745 
a: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed 
 
Figure 1. Reversal Percentage, by Circuit
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Of the cases in which a lower court’s dismissal of a complaint was reversed, 
slightly more than half112 can be clearly categorized as what I will refer to as 
“Conley-based reversals”—that is, reversals that rested on the broad reading of 
Conley that was rejected by Iqbal and Twombly. Again, there is a significant 
amount of inter-circuit variation in the percentage of reversals that are categorized 
as based on Conley. As described above, these cases were identified by a close 
inspection of the reasoning of the reversing court and the appellate court’s 
description of the pleadings at issue. For example, excluded from consideration 
were reversals based on legal conclusions such as standing or whether a statute 
created a cause of action.113 On the other hand, reversals that explicitly accepted the 
truth of pleadings that the appellate court itself described as “conclusory”114 or 
“sparse” were generally included in the cohort of Conley-based reversals.115 And 
any appellate decision that explicitly rested its holding on the broad language of 
Conley “retired” by Twombly—that a court must deny a motion to dismiss if it can 
imagine “any set of facts” that establishes the defendant’s liability—was included 
in the cohort. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. See infra Table 3. 
 113. See, e.g., Comrie v. Bronx Lebanon Hosp., No. 97-7484, 1998 WL 29643 (2d Cir. 
Jan. 27, 1998); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); Finlator v. Powers, 
902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 114. See, e.g., Addams v. City of Chicago, No. 92-4036, 1994 WL 64332, at *3 (7th Cir. 
Mar. 2, 1994). 
 115. See, e.g., IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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Table 3. Conley-Based Reversals, by Circuit 
 
Jurisdiction Conley Reversals (%) Total Reversals 
Supreme Court 2 (66.7%) 3 
First Circuitb 2 (25.0%) 8 
Second Circuitb 35 (66.0%) 53 
Third Circuit 4 (44.4%) 9 
Fourth Circuit 13 (72.2%) 18 
Fifth Circuit 11 (52.4%) 21 
Sixth Circuit 13 (48.2%) 27 
Seventh Circuit 37 (57.8%) 64 
Eighth Circuita 5 (29.4%) 17 
Ninth Circuit 22 (61.1%) 36 
Tenth Circuit 8 (44.4%) 18 
Eleventh Circuit 7 (43.8%) 16 
D.C. Circuit 9 (69.2%) 13 
Total 168 (55.5%) 303 
a: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed; b: 0.05<t<0.10, Fisher exact 
probability test 
 
 
Of the 168 cases that were reversed on Conley grounds, 137 were able to be 
coded as successful or unsuccessful.116 Of these, seventy-six, or 55.5%, were 
classified as successful, and sixty-one, or 44.5%, were classified as unsuccessful. 
The breakdown of outcomes is detailed in Table 4. 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. For any case that could not be coded as successful or unsuccessful, I have made 
every attempt to reach out to the litigants or attorneys involved. Many of the cases were 
terminated over ten years ago, making follow-up difficult. Of the cases that could not be 
coded as successful or unsuccessful, it is likely that at least fourteen of them involved 
settlements, but this has not yet been confirmed. Thus, if they were added to the cohort, and 
the additional cases lost to follow-up were all presumed to be unsuccessful, the success rate 
would change to 53.5%. 
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Table 4. Conley-Based Reversals, by Ascertainable Outcome117 
 
Outcome Cases Frequency 
Successful   
 Settled  49 35.7% 
 Stipulated Dismissal 
 (Settlement) 
 21 15.3% 
 Plaintiff Verdict   3 2.2% 
 Other   3 2.2% 
 Total Successful 76 55.5% 
Unsuccessful   
 Dismissal  12 8.8% 
 Summary Judgment  36 26.3% 
 Defendant Verdict  11 8.0% 
 Other   2 1.5% 
 Total Unsuccessful 61 44.5% 
Total Cases 137  
 
Tables 5 and 6 break the cohort down according to case type, both 
descriptively118 and by the “nature of suit” indicated by the plaintiff on the civil 
cover sheet provided by the Administrative Office.119 Notably, civil rights cases, 
including employment discrimination cases, comprised more than half of the 
cohort.120 And antitrust and securities fraud cases together made up almost 10% of 
the cohort. The success rate of civil rights cases is even more notable when one 
appreciates the extent to which most pro se litigants were concentrated in those 
case categories. As Table 7 demonstrates, thirty-one, or 22.6%, of the Conley 
reversed cases were litigated by prisoners who were pro se on remand in the district 
court.121 Of these thirty-one pro se litigants, only three, or just under 10%, were 
successful, but twenty-nine were involved in civil rights cases, including 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See infra Appendix Table 2 for the raw data upon which this table is based. 
 118. For each Conley-based reversal, I summarized the nature of the case according to 
the terms in Table 5. 
 119. The Civil Cover Sheet used by most districts can be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044.pdf. 
 120. The percentage of employment discrimination cases is consistent with national 
figures, as employment discrimination cases have grown to be the category comprising the 
largest single percentage of the federal civil docket, currently around 10%. Clermont & 
Schwab, supra note 29, at 429. This explosion began in the 1990s, thought to be due in part 
to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, along with the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. Id. at 433 (noting that the 1991 
Act added the right to a jury trial and compensatory and punitive damages, among other 
relief). Clermont and Schwab note that, notwithstanding the availability of the ADA and the 
FMLA, Title VII is the driving force behind employment discrimination claims because 
almost 70% of employment discrimination cases arise under Title VII. Id. 
 121. Some litigants were pro se on appeal, but were granted motions for appointment of 
counsel after reversal. E.g., Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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employment discrimination.122 Thus, as Table 9 reflects, when only counseled 
cases are considered, the success of civil rights cases, including employment 
discrimination cases, jumps considerably. As will be discussed below, this is 
consistent with other research demonstrating a positive correlation between 
ultimate success and the assistance of counsel.123 In addition, any statistically 
significant differences between the success of these case types and the rest of the 
cohort disappear, such that only securities fraud cases continue to have a 
statistically significant higher success rate. 
 
Table 5. Conley-Based Reversals, by Case Type and Success 
 
Case Type Success (%) Unsuccessful (%) Total (%) 
Tort 6 (46.2%)  7 (53.8%) 13 (9.5%) 
Contractb 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 7 (5.1%) 
Employment Discrimination 14 (66.7%) 7 (33.3%) 21 (15.3%) 
Prisona 5 (21.7%) 18 (78.3%) 23 (16.8%) 
Antitrustb 7 (87.5%) 1 (12.5%) 8 (5.8%) 
Non-Prison Civil Rights 17 (48.6%) 18 (51.4%) 35 (25.5%) 
Consumer 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 5 (3.6%) 
RICO 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 4 (2.9%) 
Sec. Frauda 6 (100%) 0 6 (4.3%) 
ERISA 3 (100%) 0 3 (2.1%) 
Other 7 (58.3%) 5 (41.7%) 12 (8.8%) 
Total 76 (55.5%) 61 (44.5%) 137 
a: t<0.05, Fisher’s exact test, one-tailed; b: 0.05<t<0.10, Fisher’s exact test, one-
tailed 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. See infra Table 8. The percentage of employment discrimination cases proceeding 
pro se is not all that different from what has been reported over the same time period for all 
employment cases. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 29, at 434 tbl.1 (showing that almost 
17% of employment discrimination plaintiffs proceeded pro se in district court between 1998 
and 2001); id. app. at 457 (reporting that 19.8% of employment discrimination plaintiffs 
proceeded pro se between 1979–2000, with 25.95% of non–employment discrimination 
plaintiffs proceeding pro se, and 3.15% of contract and tort plaintiffs proceeding pro se). 
 123. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort 
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 692 (1987); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 
770–71, 773–74. As with other studies, these data do not show that having an attorney 
causes an increase in success. It may just as well be the case that the merit of a litigant’s case 
makes it more likely that an attorney will agree to represent her. 
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Table 6. Conley-Based Reversals, by Administrative Office Code and Outcome 
 
AO Code Successful (%) Unsuccessful (%) Total 
110 (Insurance) 1 (100%) 0 1 
120 (Marine Contract) 1 (100%) 0 1 
140 (Neg. Instr.) 1 (100%) 0 1 
190 (Contract) 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 7 
245 (Tort Prod. Liab.) 1 (100%) 0 1 
320 (Assault, Libel) 1 (100%) 0 1 
340 (Marine PI) 1 (100%) 0 1 
360 (Other PI) 5 (62.5%) 3 (37.5%) 8 
362 (Med. Mal.) 0 1 (100%) 1 
370 (Other Fraud) 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 2 
371 (TILA) 1 (100%) 0 1 
410 (Antitrust) 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 7 
422 (Bank Appeal) 2 (100%) 0 2 
430 (Banks) 0 1 (100%) 1 
440 (Civ. Rights) 17 (51.5%) 16 (48.5%) 33 
442 (Civ. Rights Jobs) 8 (61.5%) 5 (38.5%) 13 
443 (Civ. Rights Accom.) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 4 
470 (Civil RICO) 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 5 
550 (Prisoner-Civ. Rights) 5 (23.8%) 16 (76.2%) 21 
710 (FLSA) 1 (100%) 0 1 
720 (LMRA) 0 1 (100%) 1 
790 (Other Labor) 0 1 (100%) 1 
791 (ERISA) 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 4 
820 (Copyright) 0 1 (100%) 1 
840 (Trademark) 1 (100%) 0 1 
850 (Securities) 4 (100%) 0 4 
890 (Other Statutory) 3 (33.3%) 6 (66.7%) 9 
895 (FOIA) 0 2 (100%) 2 
950 (State Statute 
Constitutionality) 
0 2 (100%) 2 
Total 76 (55.5%) 61 (44.5%) 137 
 
 
Table 7. Conley-Based Reversals, by Pro Se Representation and Outcome 
 
Representation in 
District Court 
Successful (%) Unsuccessful (%) Total 
Counseleda 73 (68.9%) 33 (31.1%) 106 
Pro Sea 3 (9.6%) 28 (90.4%) 31 
Total 76 (55.5%) 61 (44.5%) 137 
a: t<0.05, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed 
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Table 8. Conley-Based Reversals, by Pro Se Status and Case Type 
 
Case Type Counseled (%) Pro Se (%) Total 
Tort 11 (84.6%) 2 (15.4%) 13 
Contract 7 (100%) 0 7 
Employment 
Discrimination 
18 (85.7%) 3 (14.3%) 21 
Prison 7 (30.4%) 16 (69.6%) 23 
Antitrust 8 (100%) 0 8 
Non-prison civil 
rights 
25 (71.4%) 10 (28.6%) 35 
Consumer 5 (100%) 0 5 
RICO 4 (100%) 0 4 
Sec Fraud 6 (100%) 0 6 
ERISA 3 (100%) 0 3 
Other 12 (100%) 0 12 
Total 106 (77.4%) 31 (22.6%) 137 
 
 
Table 9. Conley-Based Reversals, by Case Type and Outcome, Counseled 
Plaintiffs Only 
 
Case Type Success (%) Unsuccessful (%) Total 
Tort 6 (54.5%)  5 (45.5%) 11  
Contract 6 (85.7%) 1 (14.3%) 7  
Employment 
Discrimination 
14 (77.8%) 4 (22.2%) 18 
Prison 3 (42.8%) 4 (57.2%) 7 
Antitrust 7 (87.5%) 1 (12.5%) 8 
Non-Prison Civil 
Rights 
16 (64.0%) 9 (36.0%) 25 
Consumer 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 5  
RICO 2 (50%) 2 (50%) 4 
Sec Frauda 6 (100%) 0 6 
ERISA 3 (100%) 0 3 
Other 7 (58.3%) 5 (41.7%) 12 
Total 73 (66.4%) 33 (33.6%) 110 
a: t<0.10, Fisher exact probability test, one-tailed 
 
Thus, the success of the cohort can be briefly summarized as follows. When 
considered as a whole, the rate of success is about 55%, with settlements and 
stipulated dismissals accounting for nearly all of the successful outcomes. When 
considered more closely, the data also reflect high levels of success for certain 
categories of claims—most notably securities fraud, consumer, and contract 
claims—as well as a high percentage of civil rights cases within the cohort. And 
even the civil rights claims achieve a high degree of success, as will be shown by 
comparison below to other reported data. 
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B. “Control” Group Characteristics 
As explained above, I used civil terminations from the years 1990 to 2000 to 
serve as a control group for the cohort data. Although there is not a precise overlap 
in terms of the years covered by the control group and the cohort, the vast majority 
of cohort cases were resolved between the years 1990 and 2000. The control group, 
consisting as it does of every civil case terminated during the relevant time frame, 
is larger than the cohort by several orders of magnitude. In 1991 alone, 193,491 
cases were terminated, and over the entire time period slightly more than 2.1 
million cases were resolved by the federal courts.124 
The analysis of the Administrative Office data was conducted in the following 
manner: For all civil terminations between 1990 and 2000, the disposition and 
prevailing party were cross-tabulated. Both of these variables can be coded in 
unilluminating ways—for instance, prevailing party may be coded as “unknown” 
or “both,” and disposition has eighteen different possible codings.125 Based on the 
cross-tabulation, dispositions were then divided into four categories: plaintiff’s 
success, defendant’s success, uncertain success, and excluded categories.126 Using 
only the first three categories, absolute numbers and relative frequencies were 
calculated for year-by-year dispositions between 1990 and 2000 and for particular 
types of lawsuits. The year-by-year breakdown of the absolute number of cases that 
fell within each category is reprinted in the Appendix.127 Tables 10a, 10b, and 10c 
reflect the year-by-year breakdown of the outcome frequency within each category, 
divided according to unsuccessful, successful, and questionable outcomes, 
respectively. 
Comparing these comprehensive data to the success rates observed in the cohort 
of cases analyzed above, there are several observations to be made. Although there 
is some significant variation in the overall success rate observed in the 
Administrative Office data, particularly given the large sample size, the success 
rate in the Conley-reversed cases appears to be well within the range of average 
success rates of all cases terminated over this time period. Indeed, depending on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. See infra Appendix Table 3. 
 125. The inaccuracies of the Administrative Office coding in the databases used here 
have been remarked on above. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also 
Hadfield, Trials, supra note 96 at 723–28 (reporting on an audit of Administrative Office 
coding errors). 
 126. The following dispositions were considered clear plaintiff successes: default 
judgment; consent judgment; jury, directed, or bench verdict for the plaintiff; judgment for 
plaintiff by pretrial motion; judgment for plaintiff on other grounds; and settlement. 
Defendant successes comprised the following: verdict for the defendant, both parties, or an 
unknown party; dismissal for failure to prosecute or for lack of jurisdiction; judgment for 
defendant or for both parties by pretrial motion; and judgment on other grounds for 
defendant or for both parties. Uncertain success was defined as voluntary dismissal or other 
dismissal. Excluded from consideration were the following dispositions: remand to state 
court; remand to an agency; transfer to a different court or to the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1407; judgments enforcing arbitration awards or on 
de novo trial post-arbitration; stays for bankruptcy proceedings; statistical closings; and 
dispositions related to magistrate judge appeals. 
 127. See infra Appendix Table 3. 
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whether voluntary and other dismissals are properly categorized as successes or 
not, it may be that the success rate in the Conley-reversed cases is, on average, 
higher than in the generality of cases.128 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. It is important to caution against drawing too strong a conclusion from these data. 
Aside from the size of the sample, most of the cohort cases have already overcome a 
significant procedural hurdle—surviving a motion to dismiss. The same cannot be said of all 
of the cases in the Administrative Office dataset. 
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More importantly, however, when one compares the Conley-reversed cases 
based on specific case type, it becomes more evident that the consequence of 
applying an Iqbal/Twombly pleading rule will have a larger-than-considered effect 
on meritorious cases. For instance, prisoners’ rights cases in the studied cohort 
achieved success about 22% of the time.129 When looking specifically at cases with 
the Administrative Office Code 550, success was achieved in almost 24% of cohort 
cases, although the sample is admittedly small.130 This is significantly higher than 
the 7% success rate achieved in prison cases overall,131 although, again, much 
depends on whether voluntary and other dismissals may be counted as successes.132 
If these last two disposition categories are considered successful, then the success 
rate for prison cases in the cohort jumps to almost 52%.133 Similarly, when one 
compares the success of non-prisoner civil rights claims in the cohort studied here, 
best represented by Administrative Office Code 440, the rate of success in this 
cohort is either slightly higher or lower than the overall rate, depending on how the 
questionable cases fall.134 The same is true of employment discrimination cases 
(best represented by Administrative Office Code 442), in which the Conley-
reversed cases achieve as high a rate of success as the Administrative Office Code 
442 cases even under the most expansive definition of success. One sees the same 
pattern in contract and antitrust cases as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. See supra Table 5. 
 130. See supra Table 6. 
 131. See infra Table 11b. 
 132. Eisenberg and Schlanger have reported that, with respect to prisoner cases, the 
Administrative Office coding of plaintiff judgments is generally accurate, with some 
marginal exceptions. Eisenberg & Schlanger, supra note 105. 
 133. The Administrative Office data for code 550 cases is perhaps the best example of 
why one must be skeptical of the claim that all “other” dismissals should be considered 
successful dispositions for prisoner-plaintiffs. As Tables 11b and 11c demonstrate, in every 
case category other than prisoner cases, the settlement rate is always significantly higher 
than the “other” dismissal rate. In prisoner cases, however, the rate for “other” dismissals is 
more than five times the settlement rate. It is hard to imagine an explanation as to why 
successful prisoner cases, as opposed to all other cases, would be more likely to be resolved 
through “other” dismissals than through settlement. In addition, no other researcher has 
reported success rates approaching 50% in prisoner cases. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 
93, at 1557–58. 
 134. Compare supra Table 6 with infra Table 11b. 
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In addition to the figures generated from the Administrative Office data, there 
are more specific rates of success reported for particular areas of litigation. For 
prisoner cases, estimates of success have ranged between 15% and 18%.135 In civil 
cases that involve neither prisoners nor constitutional claims, rates of success have 
been reported at much higher levels, between 65% and 85%.136 Constitutional tort 
cases not involving prisoners have achieved success rates approaching 50%, and 
employment discrimination cases have had success rates ranging between 55% and 
80%.137 Each of these different sources is summarized in Table 12, including the 
cohort data reported here and the data from the Administrative Office. 
Table 12 reveals the large degree of similarity between the rates of success 
reported here and the rates of success reported by other researchers and contained 
within the Administrative Office data. Thus, although the overall rate of success of 
the cohort studied here may be on the low side of the average success rate of all 
cases combined in the Administrative Office database, it is likely explained by the 
fact that civil rights and prisoners’ rights cases are overrepresented in the sample, 
and these types of cases are generally less successful than contract and tort cases.138 
                                                                                                                 
 
 135. Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1558; Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33 
& tbl.IV; see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 123, at 682. Schlanger included 
judgment for the plaintiff, settlement, or voluntary dismissal as a metric for success. 
Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1594–96. In prisoner cases, 6% to 7% were settled before trial, 
1% received a judgment after trial, and 6% to 8% voluntarily dismissed their claims. Id. at 
1597. Schwab and Eisenberg gathered data from three separate judicial districts for cases 
filed from 1980 to 1981, and success included settlement, judgment, stipulated dismissal, or 
voluntary dismissal. Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 726–27. 
 136. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 122 (2009) (reviewing studies of tort 
litigation and antitrust claims reporting settlement rates of about 70% to 80% of filed cases); 
id. at 130 tbl.3 (providing data showing success rates ranging from 64% to 87% for tort 
claims and 65% to 73% for contract claims); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33 
& tbl.IV (reporting success rate of 84% for nonprisoner civil cases, excluding constitutional 
tort cases); see also Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 123, at 682 (reporting that plaintiffs in 
contested non–civil rights cases succeeded in over 80% of all cases). 
 137. See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 136, at 130 tbl.3 (providing data showing 
success rates ranging from 27% to 45% for constitutional tort claims and 55% to 82% for 
employment discrimination); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, 
Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation 
in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010) (based 
on review of randomly selected cases, reporting success by settlement or judgment of 60% 
for employment discrimination cases); Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 732–33 tbl.IV 
(reporting a success rate of 50% for nonprisoner constitutional tort cases, defined to include 
cases coded as 440, 441, 442, 443, and 444). 
 138. See infra Appendix Table 4 (showing the distribution within the Administrative 
Office dataset of certain case codes among cases terminated between 1990 and 2000). Of 
principal interest is the following: 6.8% of the terminated cases were civil rights cases (code 
440); 13% were prison cases (code 550); 5.2% were antitrust (code 410); 7.6% were 
employment discrimination cases (code 442); 7.6% were contract cases (code 190); 3.5% 
were tort cases (code 360); and 3.7% were RICO cases (code 470). When one compares 
these figures to the cohort, the cohort had fewer contract cases (5.1%), more prison cases 
(15.3%), civil rights cases (24.1%), employment discrimination cases (9.5%), and tort cases 
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This should not be surprising, as the cases that are most vulnerable to dismissal for 
having thin pleadings are ones that rely on state of mind allegations, which are the 
heart of most civil rights and private discrimination claims.139 Indeed, if the detail 
of pleadings is more a reflection of information availability than merit, cases in 
which state of mind plays a large role or in which there are large information 
asymmetries, such as civil rights, constitutional, and employment discrimination 
cases, are most likely to be vulnerable to accusations of thin pleading.140141142 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
(5.8%), and about the same number of antitrust (5.1%) and RICO cases (3.6%). See supra 
Table 6. The starkest difference is in the frequency of civil rights cases (24.1% in the cohort 
to 6.8% in the Administrative Office group), but even a marginal increase in prisoner cases 
will drive success numbers down. 
 139. In an analogous context, researchers have found that non-nuisance securities 
litigation claims in which hard evidence of fraud was lacking were less likely to be filed 
after passage of the PSLRA, suggesting that the heightened pleading standard created by that 
statute deterred filing of meritorious suits where evidence of wrongdoing was more difficult 
for plaintiffs to acquire. See Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The 
Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 35, 37 (2009). 
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IV. RAMIFICATIONS 
The goal of this research project was to incorporate empirical data into the 
debate over the value of pleading rules as screening devices. If we take the 
controversy regarding the rules of pleading to revolve around the central question 
of how best to filter out meritless claims without sacrificing meritorious claims, the 
data collected from the cohort studied here (most notably, Tables 4, 5, 9, and 12) 
provide good grounds to question the wisdom of the change in pleading adopted by 
the Court in Iqbal and Twombly. This is so for several related reasons, best 
explored by focusing first on the cohort data taken on its own and then by 
comparing the cohort data to the cases reflected in the Administrative Office 
database. 
A. Likely Effect of Iqbal as Indicated by Cohort Success Rates 
First, as the data in Table 4 reflect, under traditional definitions of “success,” the 
rules of Iqbal and Twombly pose the potential to eliminate cases that have better 
than a 50% chance of being successful. In other words, had the cohort cases been 
litigated in a post-Iqbal era rather than in the Conley era, the application of 
plausibility pleading standards would have screened out mostly meritorious cases, 
not meritless ones. This is, of course, a contestable proposition; perhaps some of 
the appellate courts that reversed dismissals in the Conley era also would make the 
same judgment in a heightened pleading context. But it is worth recognizing that, 
of the appellate cases that cited Conley between 1990 and 1999, only 41% of 
dismissals by the district court that were then appealed were actually reversed.143 
Thus, appellate courts were quite willing to affirm dismissals even in the liberal 
notice pleading era; under a plausibility pleading standard, the cases that were 
permitted to proceed in the cohort would have a much lower chance of proceeding 
now. And more to the point, there is no reason to think that courts will be skillful in 
determining which potentially dismissible case is most likely to be shown to be 
meritorious. In other words, to the extent that advocates for heightened pleading 
continue to maintain that it is an effective tool at filtering for merit, this paper 
suggests that some empirical evidence should be presented to support that 
contention.144 The absolute measures of success reported here reinforce data that 
have previously been reported in the securities litigation arena145 and should 
undermine the broad assumption that thinly pleaded cases are often meritless or, 
worse, frivolous. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. See supra Tables 1, 2. 
 144. For instance, one would expect that, in a heightened pleading world, cases that 
survive motions to dismiss should be more likely to be successful than cases that survive 
motions to dismiss in a notice pleading world. Some of this data may be obtainable now that 
statutes like the PSLRA have been in effect for some time, but the initial empirical word on 
the PSLRA suggests quite the opposite. See Choi, supra note 22, at 623 (suggesting that 
rather than selectively deterring frivolous lawsuits, the PSLRA disproportionately 
discouraged meritorious ones). 
 145. See Choi et al., supra note 139, at 64–65. 
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It is, of course, true that relying on settlement as an indicator of merit has its 
limitations, although most empirical studies to date have used even broader 
measures of success, including voluntary dismissals and dismissals for failure to 
prosecute.146 After all, the Court explicitly justified its adoption of the Twombly 
rule based on its perception of the undue settlement pressures created by the high 
cost of discovery in antitrust litigation.147 And despite the dearth of empirical 
evidence supporting this assertion, there is at least an economically rational 
explanation for parties to settle cases of questionable merit rather than litigate to 
judgment.148 Settlement rates can also reflect strategic considerations.149 But 
characteristics of the cohort studied here suggest that settlement is less likely to 
reflect economic and strategic decisions to settle for nuisance value.150 It should be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (indicating that studies have included 
judgments, settlements, voluntary dismissals, and dismissals for failure to prosecute as 
indicative of success). In this study, voluntary dismissals have been omitted from 
consideration unless success or failure could be independently confirmed, and dismissals for 
failure to prosecute have been coded as unsuccessful. 
 147. Needless to say, there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that high discovery 
costs in complex litigation operate as a greater inducement to settle than perception of the 
merits of the case. Indeed, a recent survey of the plaintiff and defense bars indicates that 
attorneys consider discovery costs to almost routinely fall below 3.5% of their client’s stake 
in the litigation, and the attorneys generally agree that discovery costs are lower than 
expected. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, 
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 43 (Oct. 2009), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf.  
 148. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous 
Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004). But see Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional 
Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 585 
n.154 (1995) (noting that repeat players will hesitate to settle even when it is economically 
rational to do so because of fear that settlement will induce frivolous litigation by others); 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669 (1986) (criticizing economic theory that concludes there is excessive incentive 
to litigate meritless cases). 
 149. Repeat players may settle cases that appear particularly meritorious so as to avoid 
the development of unfavorable law, and plaintiffs’ counsel may have the opposite 
motivation. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel may bring cases they know will lose so as to 
develop the law or to develop discovery for the next set of cases. All of these factors may 
influence settlement rates so as to create risks in interpreting the rates as indicators of 
success. 
 150. By “nuisance value,” I mean a settlement that reflects economic considerations 
about the cost of litigation rather than any judgment about likely merit. As explained below, 
a significant portion of the settlements recorded here were in cases in which government 
entities were defendants. For a variety of reasons, government entities may be less likely to 
agree to a settlement as an economically motivated alternative to litigation. See Dawson v. 
United States, 68 F.3d 886, 897–98 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court’s sanction of a 
government attorney who refused to make a settlement offer to a pro se prisoner because of 
the government’s fear that settling prisoner claims will encourage other suits); Borchers, 
supra note 148, at 585 n.154; Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal 
Government: Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 MO. L. REV. 709, 712 (2001) 
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remembered that each of the cases studied here involved situations in which a 
motion to dismiss was litigated, appealed, and then remanded to the district court. 
If a defendant is inclined to pay a nuisance settlement because of economic 
considerations or for strategic reasons, that defendant may be less likely to incur 
the considerable expense of moving to dismiss and defending an appeal.151 Of 
course, it takes both parties to settle, and it is possible that a plaintiff will be more 
likely to settle for nuisance value after having lost a motion to dismiss, or that 
during the time that it has taken for the dismissal to be adjudicated the plaintiff may 
perceive her injury as being less painful.152 But this same plaintiff would be 
unlikely to be motivated to accept a nuisance settlement immediately after remand 
from an appellate court decision that reversed an adverse decision by the trial court. 
Thus, at the time immediately after remand, there is a reduced likelihood that a 
settlement will reflect nuisance motivations; even if the defendant were then 
inclined to offer a nuisance settlement, it is unlikely that a plaintiff would be 
willing to accept it, having already successfully appealed one adverse decision. In 
any event, most of the cases did not settle immediately on remand; instead, almost 
75% of the time the parties engaged in some quantum of discovery before resolving 
the case through motions or settlement.153 Most of the settlements or stipulated 
dismissals took place after discovery.154 Thus, the pattern of litigation observed in 
these cases undermines the contention that they are nuisance settlements.155 
                                                                                                                 
(explaining that some cases are harder for the government to settle if a lawsuit challenges 
“the lawfulness of government action” or if there is a risk of “copycat litigation”). But see 
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 
598, 618 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to plaintiffs seeking attorneys’ fees from 
government entities as “extortionist”); David S. Mendel, Note, Determining Ripeness of 
Substantive Due Process Claims Brought by Landowners Against Local Governments, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 492, 494–95 & n.9 (1996) (discussing claim that municipalities sometimes are 
pressured to settle landowners’ suits because of potential costs of litigation). 
 151. Presumably, the incentive to offer a nuisance settlement changes as a case proceeds 
from one procedural stage to the next. With each progression, the defendant’s expectation of 
success and future litigation costs changes, but not always in predictable ways. Prior to 
moving to dismiss, however, the defendant may predict that future litigation costs could be 
high, and therefore may consider it an opportune time to negotiate a quick and inexpensive 
settlement. 
 152. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic 
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1536–40 (2008) 
(arguing that a plaintiff “adapt[s] hedonically to her injury” over time and will adjust her 
settlement demands accordingly). 
 153. See infra Appendix Table 5. 
 154. Of the eighty-seven cases in which there was some discovery after the case was 
remanded to district court from the appellate court, thirty-six were successful via settlement 
or stipulated dismissal, and five were successful in other ways. Of the thirty-one cases in 
which it could be determined that there was no discovery, twenty-one were resolved via 
settlement. Thus, most settlements occurred after discovery. 
 155. Another way to test nuisance settlements is by looking at the value of the settlement. 
Because the settlement amount was not reported in the overwhelming majority of these 
cases, and because counsel have indicated in follow-up correspondence that the settlement 
amount of some cases is confidential, it is near to impossible to use this rubric for estimating 
success. There is evidence, however, that in the area of securities litigation, the advent of the 
PSLRA decreased the likelihood that a subset of meritorious non-nuisance cases would be 
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It is also striking that a large percentage of the cases in the cohort involve 
government defendants, as one might expect with such a high percentage of civil 
rights and prisoners’ rights cases. Additionally, in some cases the settlements were 
reflected in consent decrees, which is more suggestive of ultimate merit than an 
average private settlement.156 Many observers view government defendants as 
irrational with respect to settlement. In part this is because most government 
defendants do not incur legal costs commensurate with the litigation activity in 
which they engage.157 And in part this is because they are repeat players and view 
settlement as sending a signal of weakness to other potential rent-seeking 
plaintiffs.158 Finally, some commentators simply think government entities are 
irrational.159 
For those who view settlement with irrefutable skepticism, there may be little to 
commend this study. Then again, it may be impossible to convince such individuals 
that there is anything redeeming about our current civil justice system, regardless 
of the pleading standard, given the central role occupied by pre-trial dispositions. 
Nonetheless, even for those who believe that settlements are completely irrelevant 
to underlying merit, these data provide other reasons to reconsider longstanding 
assumptions about pleading. If one examines only the cases that litigated to 
judgment, for instance, three resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff. In addition, three 
other cases resulted in judgments for the plaintiff—one via a stipulated judgment 
and two via an offer of judgment. Of the eleven cases in which judgment was 
entered for the defendant after litigation, one involved a case in which the jury 
awarded a significant verdict for the plaintiff, but the district judge granted a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, even only considering cases that were 
litigated to judgment, plaintiffs obtained success in a substantial percentage, 
slightly more than one-third. Win rates at trial for all categories of cases have 
hovered around 40% for the time period in question, although for specific 
categories of cases, like employment discrimination cases, the win rate has 
increased steadily, from about 27% in 1990 to 37% by 2000.160 
The fact that plaintiffs are not as successful as or more successful than 
defendants at trial is not necessarily an indication of weak cases. Because the most 
difficult cases, in one direction or the other, are the cases most likely to litigate to 
judgment, “the win rate [at trial] reveals something about the set of adjudged cases, 
                                                                                                                 
filed. See Choi et al., supra note 139, at 64–65. 
 156. The distinction between private settlements and court-enforced consent decrees was 
recognized by the Supreme Court itself in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), which 
considered the latter, but not the former, to justify the award of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff 
as a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
 157. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1032–33 & nn.43–
44 (2010) (summarizing literature regarding indemnification of law enforcement 
defendants). 
 158. See, e.g., Schlanger, supra note 93, at 1619 (describing “no settlement” policies in 
some prison systems).  
 159. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370–71 (2000). 
 160. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 29, at 441 fig.7. 
2011] THE COSTS OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING 165 
 
a universe dominated by close cases—but reveals little about the underlying, 
variegated mass of disputes and cases.”161 Clermont and Eisenberg have discussed 
several factors that might lead to win rates that depart from an even fifty-fifty split: 
different stakes between the parties, because of noneconomic or repeat player 
factors; misperception of the biases of the adjudicating body, in which case a 
below-50% win rate may reflect that the decision maker is not as plaintiff friendly 
as the parties predict; and the average strength of the cases, which they suggest will 
decrease as settlement and other disposition methods weed out the strongest 
cases.162 In addition, the fact that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, even if by 
only a preponderance, could explain a below-50% success rate at trial. 
These observations all relate to the data considered standing on their own, and 
not in comparison with measures of success observed in other datasets or reported 
by other researchers. Even some of the most experienced empiricists have 
emphasized that achieving an estimate of case outcomes that reflects “real” wins 
and losses can be difficult: counting “formal” wins and losses may be misleading 
because some formal losses may actually have achieved something worthwhile for 
the plaintiff, and some formal wins may have been insufficient to justify the high 
costs of litigation.163 By calculating and comparing such formal win and loss rates 
over time, however, research can at least illuminate relative success.164 Thus, the 
comparisons between the cohort and the Administrative Office data, as well as the 
data produced by other researchers, help provide a comparative success rate for the 
cohort that also undermines an apparent assumption upon which the Iqbal and 
Twombly rules rest. This comparative approach avoids resolving the difficult 
question of exactly how much weight to place on settlement versus formal 
judgment in terms of its relation to the merits of a case. 
B. Likely Effect of Iqbal as Indicated by Comparisons Between  
Cohort and Administrative Office Data 
When one turns to comparisons between the rates of success in the cohort cases 
and rates of success reported elsewhere and observed in the Administrative Office 
data, these thinly pleaded cases seem to do at least as well as the generality of 
cases. As Table 12 shows, the cohort cases occupy a middle ground, somewhere in 
the range of success reported in other datasets, depending on how one measures 
success. If success were measured only by settlements and verdicts, the cohort 
cases seem to have a higher degree of success than that reported in many other 
datasets. One can only interpret this finding so far, especially with respect to the 
data contained in the Administrative Office dataset. As Gillian Hadfield has shown 
by conducting a detailed audit of the Administrative Office data, settlements can be 
hidden in voluntary and other dismissals.165 This finding of Hadfield’s can be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 161. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 138. 
 162. Id. at 138–40. 
 163. Id. at 128. 
 164. See id. (observing that despite the limitations of relying on formal outcomes, when 
averaged and observed over several years, such measures can “tell the researcher quite a 
bit”). 
 165. Hadfield, Civil Litigation, supra note 96, at 1309–11 & tbls. 9 & 11 (showing that 
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confirmed by the thinly pleaded cohort: a number of cases that I determined to be 
settlements by looking at the actual docket were coded by the Administrative 
Office as voluntary or other dismissals.166 Thus, even if one limited the 
Administrative Office data to only settlements and verdicts, the success rate is 
probably larger than is reported simply according to the Administrative Office’s 
coding. 
In any event, this evidence is only compelling if it is related to a relevant 
assumption. For those who believe that the vast majority of the cases that will be 
dismissed under a heightened pleading scheme like that imposed by Iqbal and 
Twombly are meritless or frivolous, the data reported here seem to contradict that 
assertion. For those who believe that Iqbal and Twombly are simply better at 
screening out meritless cases than notice pleading, these data are cause for 
questioning. And for those who are willing to sacrifice a number of good cases in 
order to reduce docket levels to something manageable for federal courts, the data 
reported here at least provide some basis upon which to have the debate. That is, if 
we are focused on docket management more than ensuring that meritorious actions 
have an opportunity to blossom through litigation, we can at least debate how best 
to reduce the docket and whether prematurely dismissing a high percentage of 
cases that most people agree are important—civil rights and other public law 
cases—is a satisfactory price to be paid. After all, if heightened pleading is no 
better a filter for merit than randomly dismissing cases at the outset, then it is worth 
considering other alternatives.167 
C. Methodological Objections and Responses 
It is worth discussing some of the methodological concerns that might be raised 
about this study. First, one must address the potential for selection bias that is 
present in this study at many levels. Obviously, the source of cases is one potential 
cause of selection bias because I started with (1) appellate cases (2) between 1990 
and 1999 that (3) relied on Conley to reverse district court decisions. The reason I 
began with appellate cases has been explained above: in my view, it is a good, 
though not ideal, way of getting at the cases that are most likely to be viewed 
marginally sufficient by a judge who is interpreting Iqbal and Twombly broadly. 
Because appellate reversals reflect instances of disagreement between the district 
court (and perhaps a magistrate) and at least two appellate judges as to the 
sufficiency of a complaint under notice pleading standards, these cases are most 
likely to be vulnerable to dismissal under heightened pleading standards. 
The period of study is subject to some concern; after all, many sage observers 
have noted that even during this period of time some courts did not take Conley 
                                                                                                                 
25% of “other” dismissals were settlements and 53% of voluntary dismissals were 
settlements). 
 166. Out of twenty-one cases that I recorded as a stipulated dismissal, I could determine 
the way that the Administrative Office coded them in sixteen cases. Of those sixteen, three 
were coded as voluntary dismissals, five were coded as “other” dismissals, six were coded as 
settlements, and one was coded as a judgment (for the defendant!). 
 167. See, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Simple Proposal to Halve Litigation 
Costs, 91 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721 (2005). 
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seriously, at least for some kinds of cases.168 But at least for this cohort, the 
appellate courts stuck to the liberal reading of Conley for all kinds of cases.169 
Indeed, if courts were routinely applying heightened pleading standards pre-Iqbal 
and Twombly, and if more detailed pleading were correlated with more meritorious 
suits, then one would expect the success rates observed in the Administrative 
Office data to be even higher. The Administrative Office data do not support such 
an effect, although it is not clear that the data are coded with sufficient subtlety to 
detect it.170 
There could be a different problem with looking at the 1990 to 1999 time frame: 
if the substantive legal regime changed in a significant way during this period, it 
might affect success rates. One might imagine this to be the case in the cohort. 
Substantive law certainly changed over the period of study: Title VII was amended 
in 1991,171 the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1995,172 and 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act was passed in 1996.173 And pleading law did not 
formally change, but in 1993 the Supreme Court felt compelled to remind lower 
courts of their obligations under Conley.174 But after conducting multiple 
regression studies, time (as represented by year of termination175) does not appear 
to be a factor that exerts a significant influence on the outcomes of these cases.176 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 21, at 998–1011.  
 169. That is, one can feel fairly confident that the cases contained in the cohort were not 
subjected to a heightened pleading standard because in every case dismissal was reversed 
based upon reliance on Conley’s liberal standard.  
 170. In part, this is because the Administrative Office does not distinguish between 
pleading dismissals and summary judgment dismissals. One would imagine that in a 
heightened pleading world, pleading dismissals would be relatively higher than in a notice 
pleading world, but the Administrative Office data do not admit that kind of analysis. 
 171. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 412 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 172. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 173. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Title VIII of Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-
66 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 174. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 
U.S. 163 (1993).  
 175. Year of termination would appear to be a better indicator of time than year of filing. 
After all, when parties or courts resolve cases, they are usually doing so with respect to the 
current legal regime, or else because they are making a prediction about future legal 
changes. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 411 (2007) 
(describing the effect of shifting Supreme Court policy on decisions to settle or litigate 
cases). 
 176. Because of the small sample size when one divides the cases according to year of 
termination, the study did not have tremendous power to detect statistically significant 
differences. Nonetheless, I used the “logit” command in Stata to run multiple regressions 
using the following independent variables: pro se status in the district court, case type 
(descriptive), and time (using two different ways of measuring the time at which the case 
was terminated). Success was the dependent variable. Regression analyses are on file with 
the author, and all significance testing was conducted at the 0.10 level. Pro se status was 
significantly negatively correlated with success for all case types, without regard to time of 
termination. Only four time variables were significantly correlated with success: termination 
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A different kind of selection bias could be present because of starting with 
appellate cases. Presumably, there is a difference between plaintiffs who appeal the 
dismissal of their complaint and plaintiffs who walk away without appeal. The 
former group may be more motivated, which may correlate with success later on in 
the case, at least as it is measured here. They may also have access to greater 
resources. Defendants may be influenced by a particularly strong appellate opinion 
that they will be unlikely to prevail at a later summary judgment stage. On the other 
hand, the defendant clearly had sufficient resources and motivation in the cohort 
cases to pursue and succeed in bringing a motion to dismiss, and the trial court at 
least initially thought the cohort cases to be weak. That attitude may persist on 
remand and influence the resolution of other motion practice. Moreover, a focus on 
appealed cases may better distinguish between those thinly pleaded cases which 
could not have been amended and those cases in which the pleadings were thin for 
strategic reasons. One would expect that a plaintiff who could plead with more 
specificity would choose to amend rather than go through a lengthy and costly 
appellate process to reverse a lower court’s dismissal. 
Some of these are difficult objections to take account of. Looking to prisoner 
cases may go some way to offering assurances that the plaintiffs who appeal are not 
sufficiently different from the acquiescing plaintiffs in outcome-determinative 
ways. At least it can be said that the prisoner-plaintiffs who appeal are unlikely to 
have greater material resources than the prisoner-plaintiffs who do not. They may 
be more motivated, but prisoner litigation, with the great resistance to settling from 
prison officials,177 may be one set of cases where the plaintiff’s level of motivation 
is mostly irrelevant to the outcome of a case. Moreover, Kevin Clermont has 
provided data that suggest that, in fact, there is very little selection effect observed 
among those losing parties who choose to appeal and those who do not.178 Finally, 
it should be remembered that such a small percentage of disputes are litigated in 
general that it is likely that a plaintiff who files suit is already highly motivated to 
proceed.179 
There is another kind of selection bias at work here as well, which is that the 
cases considered in the cohort have arguably advanced past a particular procedural 
stage—the motion to dismiss—such that the success rate reported in the cohort is 
already biased toward positive success rates. The validity of this objection depends 
in large part on two other factors: (1) the percentage of cases dismissed at the 
pleading stage in run of the mill cases, and (2) the percentages of cases settled 
before issue is joined. Although the Administrative Office data cannot give us these 
                                                                                                                 
during the years 1994 and 2000, and termination after the years 1996 and 1997. The 
association between those time variables and success was positive in every case, except for 
termination during the year 1994, which was negatively correlated with success. Even after 
controlling for circuit of origin, terminations after the years 1996 and 1997 were still 
significant correlates, although origination of the case in the Seventh or Ninth Circuit also 
explained some of the variance. Similarly, termination during the years 1994 and 2000 
remained a significant correlate of success for all circuits, although origination in the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits was a significant confounder for termination in the year 2000. 
None of the time variables was as closely tied to success as pro se status in the district court. 
 177. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.  
 178. Clermont, supra note 16, at 1971–72. 
 179. Trubek et al., supra note 98, at 86–87. 
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percentages with exact precision, a rough comparison suggests that more cases are 
terminated at an early stage by settlement than by dismissal.180 Thus, this suggests 
that the effect of this selection bias is negligible, or even, in fact, should lead us to 
reduce our estimates of success in the control group as compared to the cohort. 
CONCLUSION 
All empirical data should be interpreted with caution. The data reported here are 
no exception. Litigation is extremely complex, and any attempt to quantify 
outcomes carries with it inherent risks, many of which have been discussed in this 
paper. But at the very least, these data suggest avenues for further research. We 
would benefit by having more inclusive cohorts and more precise comparison 
groups. To the extent we can eliminate methodological flaws in case selection, we 
should strive to do so. 
But whatever flaws there may be in the methodology used here, the data force 
us to confront the strength of different arguments for heightened pleading. In the 
absence of empirical data, it is insufficient to continue to rest on the assumption 
that heightened pleading can rid us of meritless cases without imposing any 
significant costs. Indeed, the data here suggest that the costs imposed by heightened 
pleading may be substantial and may not create the assumed benefits. In this sense, 
a heightened pleading standard may function in the same way that randomized 
dismissal would, amounting to a radical departure from pleading standards that few 
would find satisfactory.181 Given the ongoing debate about pleading standards that 
is taking place within the judiciary, the legislature, and the academy, the data 
presented here must be taken into account as we move forward to resolve how wide 
the path to civil litigation should be. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. See infra Appendix Table 2. 
 181. But see Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 167, at 1721 (proposing that, to address 
discovery costs and docket overload, courts randomly dismiss half of filed complaints 
seeking damages, but award double damages in cases that proceed). 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1. Cohort of Conley-Reversed Pleading Cases 
 
ID182 Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
3 Gibbs v. Norman 898 F.2d 153 
(1995 WL 
411829) 
6th Cir. 1990 E.D. 
Mich.  
89-70974 
20 Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Air Force 
109 F.3d 1475 9th Cir. 1997 D. Haw. 94-766 
22 Northington v. Jackson 973 F.2d 1518 10th Cir. 1992 D. Co. 91-352 
24 In re Johannessen 76 F.3d 347 11th Cir. 1996 M.D. Fla. 94-1900 
27 Atchinson v. District of Columbia 73 F.3d 418 D.C. Cir. 1996 D.D.C. 92-1862 
31 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. 
Narcotics Intelligence and 
Coordination Unit 
507 U.S. 163 S. Ct. 1993 N.D. Tex. 89-842 
46 Wyatt v. City of Boston 35 F.3d 13 1st Cir. 1994 D. Ma. 93-12412 
68 Harris v. City of New York 186 F.3d 243 2d Cir. 1999 S.D.N.Y. 96-7565 
76 George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce 
Motor Cars, Inc. 
148 F.3d 136 2d Cir. 1998 S.D.N.Y. 96-3140 
77 Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 147 F.3d 169 2d Cir. 1998 E.D.N.Y. 94-5944 
78 Rogers v. City of Troy, N.Y. 148 F.3d 52 2d Cir. 1998 N.D.N.Y. 94-1652 
79 Chance v. Armstrong 143 F.3d 698 2d Cir. 1998 D. Conn. 95-2010 
85 Northrop v. Hoffman of 
Simsbury, Inc. 
134 F.3d 41 2d Cir. 1997 D. Conn. 96-97 
87 Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta 
Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton Coll. 
128 F.3d 59 2d Cir. 1997 S.D.N.Y. 95-926 
99 Bernheim v. Litt 79 F.3d 318 2d Cir. 1996 S.D.N.Y. 94-5378 
101 Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc’y 68 F.3d 1512 2d Cir. 1995 S.D.N.Y. 94-2502 
102 Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ. 69 F.3d 669 2d Cir. 1995 D. Conn. 94-1365 
106 Staron v. McDonald’s Corp. 51 F.3d 353 2d Cir. 1995 D. Conn. 93-665 
107 Simmons II v. Abruzzo 49 F.3d 83 2d Cir. 1995 S.D.N.Y. 92-7615 
108 Glendora v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp. 
45 F.3d 36 2d Cir. 1995 S.D.N.Y. 93-8344 
109 Yusuf v. Vassar Coll. 35 F.3d 709 2d Cir. 1994 S.D.N.Y. 92-5462 
110 Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer 35 F.3d 77 2d Cir. 1994 N.D.N.Y. 91-1328 
114 Cohen v. Koenig 25 F.3d 1168 2d Cir. 1994 S.D.N.Y. 92-4463 
116 Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling 18 F.3d 188 2d Cir. 1994 S.D.N.Y. 90-7047 
118 Sheppard v. Beerman 18 F.3d 147 2d Cir. 1994 E.D.N.Y. 91-1349 
122 Ferran v. Town of Nassau 11 F.3d 21 2d Cir. 1993 N.D.N.Y. 91-1080 
123 In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig. 9 F.3d 259 2d Cir. 1993 S.D.N.Y. 91-4081 
128 In re Ames Dep’t Stores Inc. 
Stock Litig. 
991 F.2d 953 2d Cir. 1993 D. Conn. 90-27 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. This is a unique identifier associated with each case. 
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ID Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
130 Dwares v. City of New York 985 F.2d 94 2d Cir. 1993 S.D.N.Y. 90-4435 
133 Weiss v. Wittcoff 966 F.2d 109 2d Cir. 1992 S.D.N.Y. 91-1057 
134 Platsky v. CIA 953 F.2d 26 2d Cir. 1991 E.D.N.Y. 90-1915 
135 Santana v. Keane 949 F.2d 584 2d Cir. 1991 S.D.N.Y. 90-6309 
139 Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, 
Inc. 
945 F.2d 40 2d Cir. 1991 S.D.N.Y. 90-3841 
140 Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. 941 F.2d 119 2d Cir. 1991 S.D.N.Y. 90-2823 
148 Day v. Morgenthau 909 F.2d 75 2d Cir. 1990 S.D.N.Y. 88-8788 
157 Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l 
Med. Ctr. 
154 F.3d 113 3d Cir. 1998 E.D. Pa. 97-2669 
159 Foulk v. Donjon Marine Co. 144 F.3d 252 3d Cir. 1998 D.N.J. 95-323 
161 Graves v. Lowery 117 F.3d 723 3d Cir. 1997 M.D. Pa. 95-1624 
180 Comet Enter. Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane 
Corp. 
128 F.3d 855 4th Cir. 1997 E.D. Va. 95-926 
181 Garrett v. Elko 120 F.3d 261 4th Cir. 1997 W.D. Va. 95-494 
182 Pilz v. FDIC 117 F.3d 1414 4th Cir. 1997 D. Md. 95-3808 
191 Commercial Energies, Inc. v. 
United Airlines, Inc. 
25 F.3d 1038 4th Cir. 1994 E.D. Va. 93-120 
192 Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson 15 F.3d 333 4th Cir. 1994 E.D. Va. 93-66 
194 Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari 7 F.3d 1130 4th Cir. 1993 D. Md. 90-1096 
196 Orga v. Williams 996 F.2d 1211 4th Cir. 1993 E.D. Va. 92-64 
197 Robinson v. Ladd Furniture, Inc. 995 F.2d 1064 4th Cir. 1993 M.D.N.C. 92-273 
200 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Int’l 
Telecomms. Satellite Org. 
991 F.2d 94 4th Cir. 1992 D. Md. 90-1840 
204 De Sole v. United States 947 F.2d 1169 4th Cir. 1991 D. Md. 89-1434 
214 Shuff v. Avior Shipping Inc. 200 F.3d 814, 
1999 WL 
1093537 
5th Cir. 1999 W.D. La. 98-1388 
217 Jones v. Am. Council on Educ. 196 F.3d 1258, 
1999 WL 
800238 
5th Cir. 1999 M.D. La. 98-592 
221 Branton v. City of Dallas 166 F.3d 339, 
1998 WL 
912092 
5th Cir. 1998 N.D. Tex. 97-245 
242 Crowe v. Henry 43 F.3d 198 5th Cir. 1995 W.D. La. 92-365 
260 In re Burzynski 989 F.2d 733 5th Cir. 1993 S.D. Tex. 90-2075 
265 Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS 
Int’l, Inc. 
975 F.2d 1134 5th Cir. 1992 N.D. Tex. 88-2181 
273 Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortg. 
Corp. of Am. 
938 F.2d 591 5th Cir. 1991 S.D. Tex. 89-3006 
276 Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., 
Tex. 
929 F.2d 1078 5th Cir. 1991 N.D. Tex. 90-16 
288 Fitzpatrick v. City of Dearborn 
Heights 
181 F.3d 100, 
1999 WL 
357756 
6th Cir. 1999 E.D. 
Mich. 
97-73020 
290 Tolbert v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp. 172 F.3d 934 6th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ohio 97-7592 
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ID Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
299 Fisher v. Roberts 125 F.3d 974 6th Cir. 1997 E.D. 
Mich. 
95-40475 
307 Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. 90 F.3d 1173 6th Cir. 1996 E.D. 
Mich. 
94-60351 
318 Miller v. Currie 50 F.3d 373 6th Cir. 1995 N.D. Ohio 92-7456 
326 King v. Schotten 28 F.3d 1213, 
1994 WL 
284538 
6th Cir. 1994 N.D. Ohio 93-1249 
339 Mayer v. Mylod 988 F.2d 635 6th Cir. 1993 E.D. 
Mich. 
91-76512 
355 Warren v. Soc’y Nat’l Bank 905 F.2d 975 6th Cir. 1990 N.D. Ohio 87-3451 
363 Riley v. Daniels 894 F.2d 1336, 
1990 WL 6961
6th Cir. 1990 E.D. 
Mich. 
89-70518 
368 Scott v. City of Chicago 195 F.3d 950 7th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ill. 98-3381 
369 Smith v. Cash Store Mgmt., Inc. 195 F.3d 325 7th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ill. 99-1726 
373 Bernstein v. Bd. of Educ.  191 F.3d 455, 
1999 WL 
594920 
7th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ill. 97-6260 
375 Payton v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. 
Luke’s Med. Ctr. 
184 F.3d 623 7th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ill. 97-5558 
380 Glover v. Amoco Oil Co. 165 F.3d 32, 
1998 WL 
796083 
7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 96-3018 
381 Walker v. Wallace Auto Sales, 
Inc. 
155 F.3d 927 7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 96-5506 
385 Mack v. O'Leary 151 F.3d 1033, 
1998 WL 
416151 
7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 94-621 
392 Cook v. Winfrey 141 F.3d 322 7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 97-322 
396 Duda v. Bd. of Educ. 133 F.3d 1054 7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 96-8481 
404 Caremark, Inc. v. Coram 
Healthcare Corp. 
113 F.3d 645 7th Cir. 1997 N.D. Ill. 95-5878 
407 Lucien v. Peters 107 F.3d 873, 
1997 WL 
58812 
7th Cir. 1997 S.D. Ill. 94-130 
408 Sledd v. Lindsay 102 F.3d 282 7th Cir. 1996 N.D. Ill. 91-1917 
413 Antonelli v. Sheahan 81 F.3d 1422 7th Cir. 1996 N.D. Ill. 93-3955 
421 Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. 71 F.3d 1343 7th Cir. 1995 N.D. Ill. 94-5181 
429 Randolph v. McBride 67 F.3d 301, 
1995 WL 
578185 
7th Cir. 1995 N.D. Ind. 94-767 
432 Zarnes v. Rhodes 64 F.3d 285 7th Cir. 1995 C.D. Ill. 91-3344 
433 MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-
Bartlett & Assocs., Inc. 
62 F.3d 967 7th Cir. 1995 N.D. Ill. 92-5641 
454 Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr., Inc. 
v. McAuliffe 
37 F.3d 1216 7th Cir. 1994 N.D. Ill. 92-6659 
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ID Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
462 Jenkins v. Heintz 25 F.3d 536 7th Cir. 1994 N.D. Ill. 93-1332 
469 Randle v. Bentsen 19 F.3d 371 7th Cir. 1994 N.D. Ill. 91-5757 
471 Addams v. City of Chicago 19 F.3d 1436, 
1994 WL 
64332 
7th Cir. 1994 N.D. Ill. 92-2893 
474 Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp. 
11 F.3d 1402 7th Cir. 1993 N.D. Ill. 92-384 
475 Casteel v. Pieschek 3 F.3d 1050 7th Cir. 1993 S.D. Ind. 87-1311 
484 Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk 991 F.2d 417 7th Cir. 1993 N.D. Ill. 86-2853 
486 Hrubec v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp. 
981 F.2d 962 7th Cir. 1992 N.D. Ill. 91-4447 
499 Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. 
Co. 
959 F.2d 75 7th Cir. 1992 N.D. Ill. 90-6711 
500 McKoy v. Brennan 954 F.2d 726, 
1992 WL 
25364 
7th Cir. 1992 W.D. Wis. 90-622 
525 Hugh Chalmers Motors, Inc. v. 
Toyota Motor Sales  
184 F.3d 761 8th Cir. 1999 E.D. Ark. 97-331 
538 St. Cin v. Purkett 68 F.3d 479 
(1995 WL 
603366) 
8th Cir. 1995 E.D. Mo. 94-673 
539 Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell 56 F.3d 35 8th Cir. 1995 D.S.D. 93-4131 
546 Smith v. St. Bernard’s Reg’l Med. 
Ctr. 
19 F.3d 1254 8th Cir. 1994 E.D. Ark. 92-191 
560 Murphy v. Lancaster 960 F.2d 746 8th Cir. 1992 W.D. Ark. 89-1141 
564 Big Bear Lodging Ass’n v. Snow 
Summit, Inc. 
182 F.3d 1096 9th Cir. 1999 C.D. Cal. 97-451 
565 AlliedSignal, Inc. v. City of 
Phoenix 
182 F.3d 692 9th Cir. 1999 D. Ariz. 96-683 
570 Los Angeles Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Joint Apprenticeship 
Training Comm. v. Walter 
139 F.3d 906 
(1998 WL 
51720) 
9th Cir. 1998 C.D. Cal. 96-3792 
571 Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. 
v. Walbrook Ins.  
132 F.3d 526 9th Cir. 1997 D. Mont. 90-122 
574 Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp. 108 F.3d 246 9th Cir. 1997 C.D. Cal. 94-4382 
577 Moore v. Gerstein 107 F.3d 16 
(1996 WL 
726649) 
9th Cir. 1996 N.D. Cal. 92-20152 
582 Walleri v. Fed. Home Loan Bank 
of Seattle 
83 F.3d 1575 9th Cir. 1996 D. Or. 90-855 
583 Contreras v. United States 89 F.3d 844 
(1996 WL 
225768) 
9th Cir. 1996 S.D. Cal. 93-1367 
588 Jacobsen-Wayne v. Calvin C.M. 
Kam, M.D., Inc. 
53 F.3d 338 
(1995 WL 
234909) 
9th Cir. 1995 D. Haw. 93-255 
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ID Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
594 In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig. 42 F.3d 1541 9th Cir. 1994 C.D. Cal. 91-344 
603 Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. 
Corp. 
29 F.3d 1439 9th Cir. 1994 E.D. Cal. 89-682 
615 Plumes v. Quinlan 980 F.2d 738 
(1992 WL 
355504) 
9th Cir. 1992 C.D. Cal. 91-392 
617 Chandler v. McMinnville School 
Dist. 
978 F.2d 524 9th Cir. 1992 D. Or. 90-147 
624 Gila River Indian Cmty. v. 
Waddell 
967 F.2d 1404 9th Cir. 1992 D. Ariz. 90-841 
628 Gonzalez v. Mesa Verde Country 
Club 
951 F.2d 360 
(1991 WL 
266541) 
9th Cir. 1991 C.D. Cal. 89-6369 
633 Pruitt v. Cheney 963 F.2d 1160 9th Cir. 1991 C.D. Cal. 83-2035 
635 Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co. 
941 F.2d 864 9th Cir. 1991 N.D. Cal. 86-20018 
657 Corbin v. Runyon 188 F.3d 518 
(1999 WL 
590749) 
10th Cir. 1999 W.D. 
Okla. 
96-1766 
678 Smith v. E.N.M. Med. Ctr. 72 F.3d 138 
(1995 WL 
749712) 
10th Cir. 1995 D.N.M. 92-641 
680 Ramirez v. Okla. Dep’t of Mental 
Health 
41 F.3d 584 10th Cir. 1994 N.D. 
Okla. 
91-681 
702 Olson v. Hart 965 F.2d 940 10th Cir. 1992 D. Kan. 90-156 
721 In re Edmonds 924 F.2d 176 10th Cir. 1991 D. Kan. 87-4196 
731 Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank 129 F.3d 1186 11th Cir. 1997 S.D. Fla. 95-2650 
749 Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty. 931 F.2d 718 11th Cir. 1991 M.D. Fla. 89-1311 
752 Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale 923 F.2d 1474 11th Cir. 1991 S.D. Fla. 87-6936 
754 Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin 
Cnty. 
922 F.2d 1536 11th Cir. 1991 S.D. Fla. 88-14188 
778 Maydak v. United States 1999 WL 
1006593 
D.C. Cir. 1999 D.D.C. 97-2199 
781 Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. 
Cable & Wireless P.L.C. 
148 F.3d 1080 D.C. Cir. 1998 D.D.C. 93-2050 
782 Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr. 145 F.3d 1355 D.C. Cir. 1998 D.D.C. 95-1735 
791 Maljack Prod., Inc. v. Motion 
Picture Ass’n of Am. 
52 F.3d 373 D.C. Cir. 1995 D.D.C. 90-1121 
795 Bonham v. D.C. Library Admin. 989 F.2d 1242 D.C. Cir. 1993 D.D.C. 90-992 
799 Okusami v. Psychiatric Inst. of 
Wash. 
959 F.2d 1062 D.C. Cir. 1992 D.D.C. 90-800 
809 Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische 
Motoren Werke 
Aktiengesellschaft 
19 F.3d 745 1st Cir. 1994 D.P.R. 91-1156 
813 IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. 
Herrmann 
9 F.3d 1049 2d Cir. 1993 D. Conn. 94-2134 
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ID Case Name Cite Circuit Year District Docket No.
814 LaBounty v. Adler 933 F.2d 121 2d Cir. 1991 S.D.N.Y. 89-4242 
820 Hayes v. Poe Homes Housing 
Project Mgmt. 
931 F.2d 886 
(1991 WL 
68813) 
4th Cir. 1991 D. Md. 90-1237 
827 Walker v. Nat’l Recovery, Inc. 200 F.3d 500 7th Cir. 1999 N.D. Ill. 98-4530 
832 Bozickovich v. Harper 165 F.3d 31 
(1998 WL 
767136) 
7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 97-5138 
833 Bennett v. Schmidt 153 F.3d 516 7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 96-6914 
834 Moriarty v. Larry G. Lewis 
Funeral Dir. Ltd. 
150 F.3d 773 7th Cir. 1998 N.D. Ill. 96-6973 
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Appendix Table 2. Cohort, by Circuit, Case Type, Success, Outcome, Pro Se 
Status, Administrative Office Code, and Year Terminated 
 
ID Circuit Type Success Outcome Pro Se AOCode Yr Termed 
3 6th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1995 
20 9th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 1998 
22 10th Prison Yes PlffVerdict No 550 1995 
24 11th Other Yes Settled No 422 1996 
27 D.C. Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 360 1999 
31 S. Ct. Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef No 440 1993 
46 1st Emp Discrim No DefVerdict Yes 190 1997 
68 2d Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 2000 
76 2d Antitrust Yes Settled No 410 2000 
77 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Other No 440 2005 
78 2d Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 710 2000 
79 2d Prison Yes StipDism Yes 550 2000 
85 2d Consumer Yes PlffVerdict No 360 2001 
87 2d Antitrust Yes StipDism No 410 2000 
99 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes StipDism No 440 1998 
101 2d Emp Discrim Yes StipDism No 442 1997 
102 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef No 440 1998 
106 2d Emp Discrim Yes StipDism No 440 1996 
107 2d Prison No Dismissal Yes 550 1996 
108 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Dismissal Yes 440 1999 
109 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes StipDism No 440 1998 
110 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict Yes 440 1995 
114 2d Tort No DefVerdict No 370 1996 
116 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes StipDism No 440 1995 
118 2d Prison No SJforDef Yes 440 2002 
122 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef Yes 440 2002 
123 2d Sec Fraud Yes Settled No 850 1994 
128 2d Sec Fraud Yes Settled No 850 1993 
130 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 440 1995 
133 2d Sec Fraud Yes StipDism No 370 1992 
134 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Dismissal Yes 890 1994 
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ID Circuit Type Success Outcome Pro Se AOCode Yr Termed 
135 2d Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1996 
139 2d contract No Other No 791 2001 
140 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict No 440 1999 
148 2d Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Dismissal Yes 440 1992 
157 3d Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 440 2000 
159 3d Other Yes Settled No 120 1998 
161 3d Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 440 2000 
180 4th contract Yes Settled No 190 1998 
181 4th Prison No SJforDef No 550 1998 
182 4th Tort Yes Settled No 360 1997 
191 4th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef No 440 1995 
192 4th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes StipDism No 440 1994 
194 4th RICO Yes Settled No 470 1995 
196 4th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict No 440 1994 
197 4th contract Yes StipDism No 190 1995 
200 4th contract Yes Settled No 190 1993 
204 4th Other Yes StipDism No 890 1992 
214 5th Other Yes Settled No 340 2002 
217 5th Emp Discrim Yes StipDism No 440 1999 
221 5th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict No 442 2003 
242 5th RICO Yes Settled No 470 1998 
260 5th Tort Yes StipDism No 470 1997 
265 5th RICO No Dismissal No 890 1995 
273 5th contract Yes Settled No 140 1993 
276 5th Prison No DefVerdict Yes 550 1991 
288 6th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 440 2005 
290 6th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 443 2002 
299 6th Tort No DefVerdict No 360 1998 
307 6th Emp Discrim No SJforDef No 790 1997 
318 6th Tort No SJforDef Yes 360 1995 
326 6th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1996 
339 6th Sec Fraud Yes Other No 850 1993 
355 6th ERISA Yes Settled No 890 1992 
363 6th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1991 
368 7th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 2000 
369 7th Consumer No Dismissal No 890 2000 
373 7th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 2001 
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ID Circuit Type Success Outcome Pro Se AOCode Yr Termed 
375 7th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict No 440 2000 
380 7th Tort No Dismissal Yes 550 1999 
381 7th Consumer Yes Other No 371 1999 
385 7th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1999 
392 7th Tort Yes Settled No 320 1998 
396 7th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 1998 
404 7th Sec Fraud Yes Settled No 190 1997 
407 7th Prison Yes Settled Yes 550 1998 
408 7th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 440 1998 
413 7th Prison No Dismissal Yes 550 1998 
421 7th RICO No Dismissal No 470 1997 
429 7th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1996 
432 7th Prison No SJforDef No 550 1996 
433 7th Antitrust Yes Settled No 470 1997 
454 7th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes offer of 
judgment 
No 440 1997 
462 7th Consumer No SJforDef No 890 1996 
469 7th Emp Discrim No SJforDef No 895 1994 
471 7th Emp Discrim No SJforDef No 442 1995 
474 7th contract Yes PlffVerdict No 190 1996 
475 7th Prison No SJforDef No 550 1996 
484 7th Other No SJforDef No 820 1994 
486 7th Other No Dismissal No 890 1994 
499 7th Emp Discrim No SJforDef No 442 1994 
500 7th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1992 
525 8th Antitrust No SJforDef No 410 2000 
538 8th Prison Yes Settled No 550 1997 
539 8th Prison No SJforDef No 440 1997 
546 8th Emp Discrim No SJforDef Yes 442 1994 
560 8th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Dismissal Yes 440 1993 
564 9th Antitrust Yes Settled No 410 2001 
565 9th Tort Yes StipDism No 245 2000 
570 9th Tort Yes StipDism No 791 1998 
571 9th Other Yes Settled No 110 2002 
574 9th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 443 1997 
577 9th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled Yes 440 1997 
582 9th Other Yes Settled No 360 1997 
583 9th Tort No DefVerdict No 360 1997 
588 9th Tort No SJforDef No 362 1996 
594 9th Sec Fraud Yes Settled No 850 2001 
603 9th Emp Discrim Yes StipDism No 440 1995 
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ID Circuit Type Success Outcome Pro Se AOCode Yr Termed 
615 9th Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 1994 
617 9th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes StipDism No 440 1993 
624 9th Other No SJforDef No 950 1994 
628 9th ERISA Yes Settled No 791 1992 
633 9th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 440 1995 
635 9th Antitrust Yes Settled No 410 1996 
657 10th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 442 2000 
678 10th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 190 2001 
680 10th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 442 1995 
702 10th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No DefVerdict Yes 950 1992 
721 10th Other Yes Settled No 422  
731 11th Other No SJforDef No 430 1998 
749 11th Nonprison  
civ rights 
Yes Settled No 443 1992 
752 11th Emp Discrim No SJforDef Yes 442 1999 
754 11th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef No 440 1993 
778 D.C. Prison No SJforDef Yes 895 2007 
781 D.C. Antitrust Yes StipDism No 410 1999 
782 D.C. Prison Yes StipDism No 550 2000 
791 D.C. contract Yes StipDism No 840 2001 
795 D.C. Nonprison  
civ rights 
No SJforDef Yes 440 1995 
799 D.C. Tort No SJforDef No 890 1995 
809 1st Antitrust Yes Settled No 410 1994 
813 2d ERISA Yes Settled No 791 1996 
814 2d Prison No SJforDef Yes 550 2000 
820 4th Nonprison  
civ rights 
No Dismissal Yes 443 2002 
827 7th Consumer Yes Settled No 890 2000 
832 7th Tort Yes StipDism No 360 1999 
833 7th Emp Discrim Yes Settled No 440 2000 
834 7th Other No SJforDef No 720 2001 
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Appendix Table 5. Cohort by Discovery Post-Remand and Success 
 
Outcome Successful (%) Unsuccessful (%) Total (%) 
Discovery on 
remand 
41 (47.1%) 46 (52.9%) 87 (73.7%) 
No discovery on 
remand 
21 (67.7%) 10 (32.3%) 31 (26.3%) 
Total 62 (52.5%) 56 (47.5%) 118 
 
 
Appendix Table 6. Cohort Outcomes by Year of Resolution 
 
Year Filed Successful Unsuccessful Total 
1991 0 2 2 
1992 5 3 8 
1993 5 3 8 
1994 3 9 12 
1995 7 8 15 
1996 6 9 15 
1997 10 5 15 
1998 11 5 16 
1999 5 5 10 
2000 13 3 16 
2001 6 3 9 
2002 3 3 6 
2003 0 1 1 
2004 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 2 
2006 0 0 0 
2007 0 1 1 
NA 1 0 1 
Total 76 61 137 
 
 
 
